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JUD CAMPBELL

The Emergence of Neutrality
abstract. This Article traces two interwoven jurisprudential genealogies. The first of these

focuses on the emergence of neutrality in speech and press doctrine. Content and viewpoint neutrality are now the bedrock principles of modern First Amendment law. Yet the history of these
concepts is largely untold and otherwise misunderstood. Scholars usually assume that expressivefreedom doctrine was mostly undeveloped before the early twentieth century and that neutrality
was central to its modern rebirth. But this view distorts and sometimes even inverts historical
perspectives. For most of American history, the governing paradigm of expressive freedom was
one of limited toleration, focused on protecting speech within socially defined boundaries. The
modern embrace of content and viewpoint neutrality, it turns out, occurred only in the 1960s as
the Supreme Court merged earlier strands of rights jurisprudence in novel ways. The emergence
of neutrality, this Article shows, was more gradual, more contested, and more contingent than we
now assume. Recovering this history reveals the novelty of the modern neutrality paradigm and
casts new light on the history of other First Amendment concepts, like prior restraints, low-value
speech, and overbreadth.
To understand these developments, it is necessary to trace a second doctrinal genealogy that
focuses on the concept of fundamental rights. Older views of expressive freedom were embedded
in a diﬀerent conceptual framework for thinking about rights. And once again, the role of neutrality within this tradition was radically diﬀerent. Today, neutrality is ubiquitous in rights discourse,
reflecting the prevailing view that rights are domains in which people can make their own moral
choices. Thus defined, rights need not be absolute, but the government must at least maintain
neutrality with respect to values. As this Article reveals, however, this neutrality-based view of
rights emerged well into the twentieth century, reflecting a transmogrified synthesis of earlier
ideas.
Recovering these older paradigms powerfully illustrates how deeply our current perspectives
shape the way that we view the Constitution. Principles that appear to be inherent to the very idea
of expressive freedom or the very idea of rights, it turns out, are refracted through a modern lens.
Integrating history into rights jurisprudence thus poses a substantial and unresolved challenge,
warranting further engagement by scholars and judges. On its own, history cannot dictate whether
our approach to rights needs adjustment. But it can refocus attention on values and choices that
modern doctrine too often ignores.
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introduction
Neutrality is the lifeblood of modern speech and press doctrine. “[A]bove all
else,” the Supreme Court has declared, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”1 This rule of “content neutrality” presumptively
disallows the government from restricting speech based on what a speaker has
communicated. For instance, although the government may punish a speaker for
having violated a noise ordinance,2 it generally cannot restrict speech on account
of what that person said.3 The content-neutrality principle thus treats speech
and press freedoms as nondiscrimination rules, with content-based restrictions
triggering strict scrutiny.4 There are a few exceptions,5 but their narrowness underscores the centrality of the content-neutrality requirement.6 So does the
Court’s insistence that these exceptions have to be identified using a neutral tradition-based analysis, without weighing the costs and benefits of certain types
of speech.7
In addition to requiring content neutrality, the First Amendment also disables the government from asserting interests that privilege certain viewpoints

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

864

Police Dep’t. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). This line is frequently quoted. See, e.g., Barr v.
Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (quoting this passage); Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (same).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1989).
See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). Scholarship
on content neutrality is voluminous. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited,
98 VA. L. REV. 231 (2012); Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for
Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261 (2014); Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233. For
classic discussions, see John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1975); Geoﬀrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); and
Geoﬀrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). For critical treatments, see, for example, Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1427 (2017); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2006); and Martin H. Redish,
The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
See, e.g., Reed, 576 U.S. at 163-64.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002).
See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371-72 (emphasizing the narrowness of “unprotected” speech
categories). Indeed, even when the government limits “unprotected” speech, the neutrality
rule still disallows most content-based subclassifications. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 383-88 (1992).
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-72 (2010).

the emergence of neutrality

over others,8 thus barring speech-restrictive eﬀorts to instill morality or otherwise shape the way that people think.9 For instance, even though interests like
promoting civic virtue or reducing bigotry might seem compelling, the government cannot defend speech restrictions on those grounds. Doing so “grates on
the First Amendment,” the Court has explained, “for it amounts to nothing less
than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.”10 In this
way, modern doctrine circumscribes not only the types of rules that the government can use when restricting speech but also the interests that it may pursue.
For the most part, therefore, the government cannot restrict speech based on
communicative harms—that is, harms arising from what someone has expressed.
Yet these neutrality principles are new. American law has always been protective of expression to some extent, but not by requiring content or viewpoint
neutrality. Those concepts are twentieth-century innovations. From the Founding through the mid-twentieth century, the freedom of speech entailed a limited
right of toleration, not neutrality.11 To be sure, speakers were still mostly free to

8.

See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976); see also Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 413, 444 (1996) (“[T]he Court almost always rigorously reviews and then invalidates
regulations based on viewpoint.”).
9. For cases rejecting moral rationales for restricting speech, see Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct.
2294, 2300 (2019); and United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817-18 (2000).
Compare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968), which recognizes greater leeway
to suppress the dissemination of sexually explicit materials to minors. For cases rejecting governmental justifications that turn on changing how people think, see cases cited infra note 10;
and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2453 (1996). There is some debate over whether the latter principle is
properly described in terms of “viewpoint neutrality.” Many understand viewpoint neutrality
as barring governmental eﬀorts to shape people’s thoughts. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-32 (7th Cir. 1985), aﬀ ’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Geoﬀrey R.
Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461,
461-62 (1986). Others distinguish the rule against viewpoint-based ends, see Volokh, supra,
at 2427, from the ban on speech-restrictive means designed to change how people think, see
id. at 2453-54. For now, it is enough to say that these principles belong to the same conceptual
family. Cf. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 615, 621 (1991) (explaining that content neutrality is “best . . . understood not as a single
concept, but as a family of concepts”).
10. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995).
This quotation referred specifically to “noncommercial speech restriction[s],” id., but the
Court has endorsed the same principle in commercial-speech cases, see Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 577 (2011).
11. In addition to the discussion in this paragraph, see infra notes 76-77, 207-210, 245, 248-252,
288-290, 339-342 and accompanying text. For a more detailed sketch of the diﬀerence between
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decide what to say. Well-intentioned speech on matters of public concern was
considered privileged, so the government had to tolerate a wide range of views.
Moreover, the rule against prior restraints ensured that speech restrictions could
only be imposed by a jury after publication, rather than having a public oﬃcial
determine ahead of time what could be published. But so long as these principles
were followed, laws could maintain socially defined limits on public discourse
and favor certain messages over others.12 Thus, many patently non-neutral rules
were consistent with older notions of expressive freedom. Indeed, to the extent
that neutrality entered the doctrinal picture, content-neutral restrictions of
speech were sometimes thought to be more constitutionally suspect.13
Despite the central role of neutrality today, the current literature lacks any
detailed treatment of its jurisprudential history.14 The conventional view is that
positions of orthodoxy, toleration, and neutrality, see Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 308-12 (1990). For a parallel taxonomy using the terms assimilationism, pluralism, and individualism, see Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law:
Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 299-305 (1988). The
term “toleration” is not meant to suggest that the government was merely exercising forbearance and could extend or deny speech rights at pleasure.
12. To be sure, modern doctrine still imposes boundaries on speech. But these limits are of a different sort. For the most part, boundaries are now defined either in terms of noncommunicative harms, as recognized in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968), or in terms
of predefined categories that preclude legislative or judicial assessments of communicative
harms, see infra notes 371-374, 399-400 and accompanying text. That said, First Amendment
analysis is patently non-neutral in certain domains, like doctrines relating to restrictions of
student speech and public-employee speech. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.” (quotations omitted)); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (“We
reject . . . the notion that the First Amendment shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their oﬃcial duties.”). In contrast to the modern focus on neutrality,
the older approach did not preclude legislative or judicial assessments of communicative
harms. In other words, it did not reflect a neutrality paradigm.
13. See infra notes 91-93, 212-213, 248-257, and 296 and accompanying text.
14. Current accounts are quite brief. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, The Sickness unto Death of the
First Amendment, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 765-73 (2019); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint
Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 99-100 (1996); Paul B. Stephan III, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 215-23 (1982). Other scholars have
noted the absence of neutrality without tracing its development. See, e.g., John Fee, Speech
Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1103, 1116 (2005); Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value
Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2192-95 (2015); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 101 (1995); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 121 (1981); David Yassky, Eras of the First
Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1707 (1991). Inaccuracies often appear in these accounts.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text. For broader historical studies of expressive freedom,
see, for example, LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
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constitutional protections for speech were absent until the 1930s and ’40s,15 and
that the Supreme Court embraced content and viewpoint neutrality in its earliest
First Amendment decisions.16 Neutrality and expressive freedom, the thinking
goes, were reborn together. And this lesson is reinforced by the view that Carolene Products introduced a values-neutral vision of substantive rights.17 Indeed,
with neutrality so firmly embedded in First Amendment doctrine, other approaches may seem unimaginable. If the First Amendment does anything, the
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S
DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2000); MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870-1920
(1997); and G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996).
15. The view that the Speech Clause was an empty vessel is widespread. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1180 (6th ed. 2020) (“Because even for originalists there is little
guidance from history or the framers’ intent as to the meaning of the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court inescapably must make value choices as to [First Amendment doctrine].”);
Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1298 (1983); David A.
Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33, 33-59 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoﬀrey R. Stone eds., 2002);
Geoﬀrey R. Stone, The Story of the Sedition Act of 1798: “The Reign of Witches,” in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 13, 23 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012). And historians
often posit that protections for expressive freedom were subsumed within police-powers jurisprudence and “did not have any independent force as a constitutional doctrine.” Reuel E.
Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First
Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 34 (2000); see, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, VOLUME III: 1930-2000, at 692-93 (2019); see also David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 562-72 (1981) (describing scholarship taking this
view). But see Lakier, supra note 14, at 2196 (“Speech about matters of public concern received
greater constitutional protection than other kinds of speech . . . .”).
16. See, e.g., DeGirolami, supra note 14, at 771 (“The Barnette opinion represented a new commitment to absolute anti-orthodoxy—the view that the government could have no say at all in
assessing the communal value of speech.”); Heins, supra note 14, at 99-100 (attributing viewpoint neutrality to West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943));
Lakier, supra note 14, at 2168 (“[D]iscriminat[ion] against speech on the basis of its content . . . was something that the new conception of freedom of speech otherwise disavowed
[by 1942].”); Schiller, supra note 15, at 68 (mentioning “a presumption that content-based
restrictions on speech were unconstitutional”); Stephan, supra note 14, at 215 (“Concern about
discrimination in the context of free expression emerged as an outgrowth of the general extension of the [F]irst [A]mendment undertaken by the Hughes Court.”); Williams, supra note
9, at 622 (“The development of free speech doctrine is generally traced to the beginning of the
twentieth century. The concern with content discrimination by government was a part of that
doctrine from very near the beginning and is in no sense a new idea.”).
17. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 302 (1989) (“The faith of Carolene
Products was that one could exclude values from the judicial role, and by casting them out
substitute the task of purifying the democratic process.”). For an eﬀort to historicize the treatment of neutrality in the equal-protection realm, see Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A
Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503, 505-07 (1997).
IN
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thinking goes, surely it bans the government from targeting a speaker’s message.18
This Article challenges these engrained assumptions. Modern views of expressive freedom did not emerge ex nihilo in the twentieth century.19 It only appears that way because our interpretive assumptions about rights are so radically
diﬀerent from those of the past. Nor did the initial wave of speech-protective
judicial decisions embrace content or viewpoint neutrality. To be sure, First
Amendment law quickly became more protective of heterodox views, and some
doctrines that resemble neutrality began to emerge almost immediately. But
these developments did not prevent the government from imposing socially defined boundaries on expressive freedom or otherwise elevate neutrality as a central value. In fact, the expressive equality that the Supreme Court embraced was,
in some important respects, counter to modern doctrine. Neutrality emerged in
a more gradual, more contested, and more contingent manner than we now assume.20
In tracing this doctrinal genealogy, this Article also aims to illuminate the
development of modern rights jurisprudence, including the role of neutrality.
Up until the twentieth century, fundamental rights were bimodal, consisting of
retained natural rights (grounded on social-contractarian principles) and fundamental positive rights (grounded largely on common law). The details of
these concepts will be spelled out later.21 But two features bear emphasis here.

18.

A search for “if the First Amendment means anything” leads to such statements. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct
and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1165
(1982); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 792, 824 (2000)
(taking as given that the First Amendment demands viewpoint neutrality).
19. David Rabban ably made this point four decades ago, see Rabban, supra note 15, at 519, but it
is still underappreciated in the literature.
20. Although this Article does not employ Laura Weinrib’s focus on nonjudicial sources, it reinforces her critique of how present-day views of expressive freedom and portrayals of its history usually approach the topic in an essentialist way, treating expressive freedom as having a
certain form because that just is the meaning of the concept. The modern notion that expressive freedom entails neutrality, Weinrib powerfully shows, was constructed by twentieth-century actors. See LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE 8-12 (2016); Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v.
Dennett and the Changing Face of Free Speech, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 325, 335-42 (2012); see also
RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 5 (2007) (“[T]he world of civil rights
was conceptually, doctrinally, and constitutionally up for grabs.”). For other work in this vein,
see, for example, SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF PRESS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2016); and JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW (2007).
21. See discussion infra Sections I.A-II.A.
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First, although these rights were often listed in constitutions, they were not distinctively textual objects—that is, their force and meaning did not derive from
their enumeration. Rather, jurists generally described rights as being grounded
in unwritten fundamental law that predated the adoption of constitutions. Enumeration simply marked their existence and fundamentality. Second, jurists typically viewed fundamental rights as grounded in general law—that is, “rules that
are not under the control of any single jurisdiction, but instead reflect principles
or practices common to many diﬀerent jurisdictions”22—thus fostering interpretive fluidity across state, federal, and even English decisions.
In the twentieth century, however, American jurists came to a very diﬀerent
understanding of rights. Reacting to the perceived flaws of Lochner-era doctrine,
progressives relentlessly attacked both pillars of traditional rights jurisprudence.
Natural rights were fictitious, they insisted, and common-law rights needed to
be reshaped to promote social ends. As a result, constitutional rights became increasingly unmoored from social-contract theory and common law, especially
once new appointments reshaped the Supreme Court from the 1930s onward.
Rather than wholly abandon prior views, however, progressive jurists blended
earlier strands of rights jurisprudence and began to treat constitutional rights as
a species of positively enacted federal law, with federal judges assuming a special
guardianship over their interpretation and enforcement.
This reconceptualization of fundamental rights did not necessarily point toward particular interpretive outcomes. But in a liberal era of secularism, individualism, and social fragmentation, what gradually emerged by the early 1970s was
a notion of rights as spheres of personal liberty, free from socially prescribed
ideas of morality.23 The very idea of a “right” thus came to embrace a sense of
neutrality with respect to values.24 And with this transformation, it became second nature to see the First Amendment as guaranteeing a privileged sphere of
individual autonomy—protected by a requirement of neutrality—rather than as

22.

Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 505 (2006).
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 205 (1996) (“[B]ecause we are a liberal society committed to individual moral responsibility, . . . any censorship on grounds of content is inconsistent with that commitment.”); Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism: Defending Carolene Products, 14 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 559, 570 (2016) (“Personal rights are about preventing political majorities from
imposing their values on individuals who may not share those values.”). For an introduction
to debates about neutrality in liberal theory, see generally PERFECTIONISM AND NEUTRALITY:
ESSAYS IN LIBERAL THEORY (Steven Wall & George Klosko eds., 2003).
24. This is not to say that values are irrelevant when defining rights in the first place. See Joseph
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 375, 388-89 (2009).
23.
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securing a limited right of toleration. In other words, the development of neutrality in modern expressive-freedom law was interconnected with a broader
shift in the very idea of constitutional rights.
The story begins in Part I with an older understanding of expressive freedom
under the First Amendment and its state-level counterparts. From the Founding
through the early twentieth century, the government could restrict expression to
promote the public good, subject to the rule against prior restraints and the privilege of discussing matters of public concern in good faith.25 Neutrality was not
required. In other words, Americans did not yet treat speech and press rights as
nondiscrimination rules that made content-based restrictions presumptively unconstitutional and that forbade eﬀorts to shape the way that people think. Indeed, even laissez-faire jurists recognized authority to restrict speech “tending to
do harm to the public morals.”26 Instead, the dominant paradigm was one of
toleration—premised on private ordering within socially defined boundaries.27
In some ways, this earlier law of expressive freedom recognized certain notions of equality—or, one might say, “neutrality.”28 From the very beginning,
equality of citizenship rights was axiomatic, thus barring the government from
arbitrarily favoring certain speakers over others.29 Nor was the government allowed to enforce uniformity of political and religious thought.30 Equality was
also reflected in the rule prohibiting the government from punishing people for
holding certain beliefs, no matter how dangerous those views might seem.31 In
these ways, the law of expressive freedom embraced what might be described as
forms of “neutrality.” My goal in contrasting earlier views with the modern notions of content and viewpoint neutrality, then, is simply to show how ideas of
25.

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

870

See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 287 (2017). For
ease of exposition, this Article often refers to “the government.” Even before “incorporation,”
jurists viewed federal speech and press rights as parallel to those secured at the state level. See
infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 192 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1886). For Christopher G. Tiedeman’s association
with laissez-faire constitutionalism, see Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1436 & n.15. As Stephen A. Siegel observes,
“Laissez-faire constitutionalism was far more supportive of the regulatory state than current
libertarian doctrine,” though Tiedeman “was far closer to a libertarian position.” Id. at 1436
n.15.
As previously noted, modern First Amendment doctrine imposes boundaries of a very diﬀerent sort, organized around a paradigm of neutrality. See supra note 12.
Neutrality has many meanings, and some of them are oppositional. See generally Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633 (2004).
See sources cited infra notes 44-45, 55, 60-62, 63-67, 69, 76-78.
See discussion infra Section I.A.
See sources cited infra note 63.
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expressive freedom have changed, not to claim that all other potential variants
of neutrality were missing, too.32 My argument is simply that older notions of
equality did not entail or presage the modern principles of content and viewpoint
neutrality.
As described in Part II, these longstanding views of expressive freedom eventually began to change alongside broader jurisprudential shifts, including the
acceptance of a more functional approach to legal interpretation. Rather than
view law as a self-contained system of historically derived rules, jurists began to
construe legal traditions by assessing their social functions. At the outset, however, reinterpretations of speech and press freedoms did not deny legislatures the
power to restrict expression based on content or viewpoint. Laws could still target communicative harms. In fact, statutory restrictions of certain messages were
sometimes harder to challenge than speech-restrictive applications of neutral
rules.
Part III then traces the doctrinal moves that eventually culminated in an embrace of neutrality. Although content and viewpoint neutrality are generally
paired today,33 they did not emerge together. Moreover, neither principle initially arose in its modern form. For instance, judges in the 1940s articulated a
nascent version of content neutrality as a way of confining the scope of First
Amendment analysis—not as a presumptive rule against content-based speech
restrictions. It was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the Supreme Court
fully embraced content and viewpoint neutrality by shifting and merging earlier
strands of doctrine. At that point, what had initially begun as a functional reinterpretation of traditional rules became something else entirely. Tied to a broader
evolution in jurisprudence, the paradigm of expressive freedom shifted from toleration to neutrality.34

32.

My reason for taking this approach is expositional. To see our constitutional past on its own
terms, we have to begin by appreciating its foreignness. But while this Article highlights nonneutral facets of earlier law, my aim is not to claim that it was entirely non-neutral in every
sense of “neutral.”
33. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 414; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 190, 196-202 (1988).
34. This shift was not instant, and older ways of thinking lingered for several decades. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399-403 (1992) (White, J., concurring). Moreover,
debates have continued over how to define and apply these neutrality principles. For an insightful discussion of how speech doctrine has shifted toward more formalist conceptions of
neutrality, see Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2018).
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Part IV considers implications of this history. In an age when anxiety about
expressive freedom is growing,35 retracing our steps is especially warranted. History alone may not tell us how to address contemporary problems. But studying
our past can help us realize that modern perspectives are grounded in twentiethcentury choices, not original or inexorable commands.
***
Before proceeding, it is worth making a few remarks about methodology.
This Article focuses on internal legal perspectives. It aims to show how certain
legal ideas changed, not why they changed. Nor does it aim to say anything about
the real-world impact of legal developments. Such an account would no doubt
be valuable, but exploring the external causes and eﬀects of legal change is not
the point of this Article. External developments are mentioned at various times
to underscore an obvious point: the internal story was linked to a broader sociopolitical context. But my goal here is simply to recover internal legal perspectives
and trace how they changed over time.36
Along similar lines, this Article examines what people said about the law, not
what they privately thought about it.37 Of course, public statements do not necessarily capture what people really think. For instance, judges who disagree with
existing precedent might try to move doctrine incrementally rather than reveal

35.

See DeGirolami, supra note 14, at 782-801 (surveying modern anxieties about free speech).
Scholarly critiques often invoke the specter of “Lochnerism.” See, e.g., Morgan N. Weiland,
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1392-93 (2017); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some
Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 421-24 (2006). Critiques of
this sort are old. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1918 (2016). For a discussion of their changing valence, see Genevieve
Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241 (2020).
36. This Article is modeled on the Cambridge School of intellectual history—focusing on ideas
themselves, not motives. See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, The Principles and Practice of Opposition:
The Case of Bolingbroke Versus Walpole, in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: STUDIES IN ENGLISH
THOUGHT AND SOCIETY 93 (Neil McKendrick ed., 1974). For further discussion of this method
and its value, see JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 16-18 (2018); and 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS:
REGARDING METHOD 96-99, 124-27 (2002). This Article diﬀers from most “Cambridge
School” scholarship by focusing on legal rhetoric, reflecting internal views of doctrine. But
this approach still embraces—indeed, emphasizes—the importance of context and is thus a
form of “holistic” intellectual history. See Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures
of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 941-44 (2015) (discussing methods of intellectual history).
37. This distinction between legal discourse and private understandings is not the same as the
diﬀerence between internal and external points of view. For instance, jurists might share an
internal understanding of the law yet adopt diﬀerent rhetorical strategies for describing the
law—perhaps for external reasons or perhaps based on conflicting views about the proper relationship between legal rhetoric and the law.
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their views all at once. And perhaps what judges think is what really counts as
“the law.”38 This Article does not take a side in that jurisprudential debate.39 But
it does take a surface-level view of doctrine, focusing on legal rhetoric. Doing so
has limits, but it should still be of value to a wide range of scholars and jurists.
So far, this framing may seem familiar, and perhaps even old fashioned.40
But this Article departs from traditional doctrinal scholarship by treating the internal perspective itself as being fluid, not fixed. Most doctrinal histories retell
the “oﬃcial story” in our terms—explicitly focusing on Supreme Court opinions
and implicitly adopting modern attitudes about the nature of constitutional
rights.41 By contrast, my goal is to analyze whatever materials political and legal
elites previously considered authoritative and to analyze those materials using
their interpretive assumptions, not ours.
For that reason, this Article evaluates diﬀerent types of sources over time. To
recover attitudes about expressive freedom in the nation’s first century, it examines a wide range of evidence, including the political and philosophical ideas that
undergirded how Americans thought about rights. As the narrative moves into
the twentieth century, it begins to concentrate on state and federal judicial decisions. And by the 1930s, the focus is almost entirely on U.S. Supreme Court
opinions. That evidentiary shift is deliberate and tracks with changes in the way
that American elites conventionally thought about the authority to interpret and
enforce rights.
This methodology thus dovetails with my broader goal of showing that the
histories of expressive freedom and fundamental rights are interconnected. The
early twentieth century witnessed a revolution in views about the nature of
rights—where they came from; the identity of their interpretive guardians; their
means of enforcement; and their relationship to history, the common law, and

38.

On the relationship between law and discursive practices, see, for example, William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, The Oﬃcial Story of the Law (Mar. 24, 2021) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
44, 54-60 (2016); and Mikołaj Barczentewicz, The Illuminati Problem and Rules of Recognition,
38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 500, 504 (2018).
39. My focus on legal rhetoric is not meant to suggest that this is the correct or even the best way
of writing about the history of legal doctrine. But it is, in my view, a valuable form of scholarship.
40. See Cynthia Nicoletti, Writing the Social History of Legal Doctrine, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 121, 121
(2016) (“A more than passing concern with doctrine might well serve to mark someone as
old-fashioned these days . . . .”). It is worth noting that Nicoletti emphasizes the continuing
relevance of doctrinal history. See id. at 139.
41. This feature is especially evident in First Amendment scholarship, which often assumes that
the law of expressive freedom originated with Justices Holmes and Brandeis. See sources cited
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.

873

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

morality. In order to understand the way that internal views of expressive freedom were shifting, then, we also need to recognize how the interpretive lens was
changing. To borrow from Jonathan Gienapp, we cannot “keep[] the structure
of [legal] conventions constant between present and past while merely filling in
that structure with discreet component content [about particular doctrines].”42
And that is especially true with respect to rights.
Doctrinal genealogies of this sort can be especially valuable in opening our
eyes to new ways of thinking about topics that we otherwise tend to view uncritically.43 Today, our understandings of expressive freedom and of rights are so
infused with ideas of neutrality that those who dissent from the modern orthodoxy are often portrayed as challenging the very concept of free speech or the
very concept of rights. Tracing doctrinal genealogies from an internal standpoint
can at least free our minds from this type of liberal essentialism.44
At the same time, doctrinal genealogies have limits as methods of critique.
For example, this Article does not explore the causes or eﬀects of neutrality, and
therefore it cannot address the ways that neutrality might perpetuate or alleviate
longstanding social or political inequalities.45 Indeed, it does not aspire to be a
critique of neutrality at all. The current liberal order may well be worth keeping.
But this Article does challenge the notion that neutrality was baked into the core
of the First Amendment and the very definition of rights from the beginning.
American law did not, in fact, fully embrace these ideas until well into the twentieth century.
i. from the founding to the twentieth century
American jurists used to think very diﬀerently about expressive freedom. For
most of our history, speech and press freedoms entailed two common-law
rules—first, a prohibition on prior restraints and, second, a privilege of speaking
42.

Gienapp, supra note 36, at 941. Regardless of whether one describes this inquiry as a “highly
limited version of the historical inquiry,” William Baude & Steven E. Sachs, Originalism and
the Law of the Past, 37 LAW & HIST. REV. 809, 813 (2019), a principal claim of this Article is
that recovering the law of the past requires a deep sensitivity to changes in the internal perspective.
43. See, e.g., Charles Barzun & Dan Priel, Jurisprudence and (Its) History, 101 VA. L. REV. 849, 855
(2015).
44. Of course, a genealogical account of this sort is unnecessary to show that “free speech” and
“rights” are not essentialist concepts as a linguistic matter. For that lesson, one need only glance
outside the United States, where these terms often take on very diﬀerent meanings. But that
type of inquiry is not likely to change the essentialist views of positivists who view liberal
neutrality as inherent to American speech rights.
45. For a discussion of such limits, see Charles Barzun, Causation, Legal History, and Legal Doctrine,
64 BUFF. L. REV. 81, 87 (2016).
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in good faith on matters of public concern—along with a requirement that the
government could act only to promote the public good. These principles ensured
toleration of dissenting views, and they reflected notions of equality in some respects. But they did so without embracing content or viewpoint neutrality in
their modern forms. That is, American jurists during this period did not view
expressive freedom as a nondiscrimination principle that rendered contentbased rules presumptively unconstitutional or that disabled the government
from trying to shape the way that people think. Indeed, in some ways those modern ideas invert earlier attitudes about expressive freedom.
A. The Founding
The absence of neutrality at the Founding is evident in a host of non-neutral
restrictions of speech. For instance, rules against profanity, blasphemy, and sedition all targeted communicative harms and were justified as ways of shaping
how people thought.46 These types of laws existed in most, if not all, American
states.47 They were irregularly enforced but uniformly upheld.48 Understanding
their compatibility with speech and press freedoms, however, requires taking a
step back and appreciating the broader landscape of rights jurisprudence.
At the Founding, rights discourse was organized around the idea that rights
of citizenship were secured in a “social contract” or “social compact.” The social
contract was the imagined agreement by which disaggregated individuals in a
state of nature formed a political society and became citizens of that polity. On
this view, citizenship rights actually preceded the formation of a government
through a constitution.49 Their fundamental status, therefore, did not depend
on constitutional enumeration. Moreover, these rights were thought to be part
of each state’s fundamental law. Most fundamental rights were thus defined by
general fundamental law.50
Social-contractarian rights took two forms. First, there were retained natural
rights, which were prepolitical rights that individuals retained when forming a
46.

See infra text accompanying notes 65-69, 76-78.
See Campbell, supra note 25, at 310 & n.285; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW
57-58, 235, 326-28 (2010).
48. See BLUMBERG, supra note 47, at 58, 66-71, 187-242, 319, 324, 328-37.
49. For further discussion of these social-contractarian principles and their relevance to rights
discourse, see Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 85, 87-99 (2017).
50. For further discussion of general fundamental law and its application to Founding Era rights
discourse, see Jonathan Gienapp, Written Constitutionalism, Past and Present, 39 LAW & HIST.
REV. 321, 336-49 (2021).
47.
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political society. These rights included all human freedoms, such as speaking,
writing, and publishing.51 Second, social-contractarian thinkers also recognized
a set of fundamental positive rights, which specified things that the government
had to do or could not do. Examples of these rights included the warrant requirement and the right to confront witnesses. Generally speaking, the content
of fundamental positive rights was defined by the common law.52 For simplicity,
the remainder of this Article will refer to the first strand of fundamental rights
jurisprudence as “natural rights” and the second as “common-law rights.”
Both types of rights had structural and substantive implications. Structurally, natural rights undergirded republican government. Because the people retained their rights to liberty and property, the thinking went, all laws restricting
those rights had to be made and enforced by the people themselves. In other
words, only legislatures and juries could limit expression.53 Licensing schemes
that authorized executive or judicial oﬃcers to decide what could be published
were thus prohibited. And in this way, natural-rights principles bolstered the
common-law right against “prior restraints.”54
Substantively, natural-rights principles dictated that the government could
act only to promote the public good, not factional private interests. As William
Blackstone explained, civil liberty entailed “natural liberty, so far restrained by
human laws . . . as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public.”55 For the most part, assessing the public good was not a mathematical
endeavor. Rather, it turned on factual and valuative assessments that were left to

51.

See Campbell, supra note 25, at 264-65, 268-69.
See id. at 290-94.
53. See Campbell, supra note 49, at 97-98; Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 517, 527-28, 531-33 (2019). A disputed exception was judicial contempt.
See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 329 (Pa. 1788). A related but far more
contested view that emerged in the late 1790s posited that the peoples of the several states—
not the people of the United States—retained control over speech and press rights. From this
perspective, only state institutions could restrict expression. See Campbell, supra, at 549, 555,
559-60; Kevin R. Gutzman, A Troublesome Legacy: James Madison and “The Principles of ’98,”
15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 569, 583-89 (1995); H. Jeﬀerson Powell, The Principles of ’98: An Essay
in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 690-96 (1994). Like the rule against prior restraints, this reading of the First Amendment was structural. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 36-37 (1998).
54. See Campbell, supra note 53, at 531-32. This rule also eﬀectively shielded printers from liability
for unpublished materials found at a printer’s oﬃce. See JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 201-02 (David Lieberman ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007) (1771).
55. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *125.
52.
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the people themselves, acting through legislatures and juries.56 Nonetheless, two
well-recognized principles helped specify what it meant for the government to
pursue the common good.
First, laws had to be public regarding, meaning they had to be directed toward
the benefit of the society. Preventing sin and saving souls were not valid ends.
“[P]rivate vices,” William Blackstone explained, “cannot be, the object of any
municipal law” unless “by their evil example, or other pernicious eﬀects, they
may prejudice the community.”57 Thus, the government could not enforce morality as such, but as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, “an oﬀence may
be punishable, if in its nature and by its example, it tends to the corruption of
morals.”58 Similarly, when the Founders defended governmental support for religion, they emphasized the social benefits of religiosity, not divine salvation.59
Second, social-contract theory posited that citizens joined the political society on equal terms and that governmental acts therefore had to reflect equal regard for each citizen.60 This did not, of course, forbid classifications that disadvantaged some people more than others. Indeed, because many rights could be
restricted to promote the public good, equal rights did not foreclose the possibility of egregiously inequitable laws.61 But at least in theory, the underlying ob-

56.

57.

58.

59.
60.

61.

See Campbell, supra note 53, at 527-28, 531-33. Judges thus had a very circumscribed role in
enforcing natural rights. See Campbell, supra note 49, at 92-98. For further discussion of
Founding Era notions of the judicial role and their application to speech and press freedoms,
see Campbell, supra note 25, at 263-64, 276, 287, 302 n.252, 311-12.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *41; see, e.g., James Wilson, Of the Nature of Crimes; and the
Necessity and Proportion of Punishments, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1087, 108890 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (grounding criminal law on harms to society and its members); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 38 (1795) (same); see also JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 23 (2014) (describing the replacement of a “Puritan” view of morals
regulation with a more instrumental view).
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 102 (Pa. 1815) (Tilghman, C.J.); see also id.
at 103 (Yeates, J.) (“[A]lthough every immoral act, such as lying, etc., is not indictable, yet
where the oﬀence charged is destructive of morality in general; where it does or may aﬀect
every member of the community, it is punishable at common law.”).
See ELLIS M. WEST, THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA: ITS ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 70, 114, 170, 176, 187-88 (2019).
See, e.g., NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 176, 178-79, 181
(1793); WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 161-74 (Rita
Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 2001).
See William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America,
in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 85, 9497 (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003).
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jective of every law had to be the advancement of the general welfare. The quintessential violation of this principle was serving private factional interests, like
the personal interests of politicians.62
Beyond these two general principles, the Founders also recognized specific
limits on the regulation of thoughts or beliefs. The first of these was a prohibition on punishing people for their thoughts. The basic premise of this rule was
that individuals cannot control their own minds.63 Some Founders also tied the
inviolability of thoughts and beliefs to the requirement that governmental acts
had to promote the public good. “The business of civil government is to protect
the citizen in his rights, to defend the community from hostile powers, and to
promote the general welfare,” Connecticut jurist Oliver Ellsworth explained.
Thus, he concluded, “[c]ivil government has no business to meddle with the
private opinions of the people.”64
Within these limits, however, laws could restrict speech to achieve social
goals. The government “has a right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities
and impieties,” Ellsworth explained, “because the open practice of these is of evil
example and public detriment.”65 “For this reason,” he continued, “I heartily approve of our laws against drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism.”66 These laws were not aimed at punishing thoughts alone. Instead, they sought to stem the harmful consequences of expressing those
thoughts.67 “[W]hen the majority shall conceive a restraint upon contumelious
treatment of a generally received religion to be necessary,” Massachusetts politi-

62.

63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
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See Campbell, supra note 49, at 94. For further discussion, see Alan Gibson, Ancients, Moderns
and Americans: The Republicanism-Liberalism Debate Revisited, 21 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 261,
287, 292-96 (2000).
See Campbell, supra note 25, at 280-81.
Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 451 (John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leﬄer, Charles H. Schoenleber & Margaret A. Hogan eds., 1983); see also, e.g.,
JAMES SULLIVAN, A DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 36 (Boston, David Carlisle 1801) (“Wherever one man, or one
body of men can erect and maintain a coercive tribunal in favor of their own opinions, and in
opposition to that of those who diﬀer from them, there is an end of all free inquiry: and the
right of private judgment no longer exists.”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *53 (“[A]ll persecution for diversity of opinions, however ridiculous or absurd they may be, is contrary to
every principle of sound policy and civil freedom.”).
Ellsworth, supra note 64, at 451.
Id.
See, e.g., Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 404 (Pa. 1824); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294-98 (N.Y. 1811); cf. 2 SWIFT, supra note 57, at 322 (“Blasphemy is so
indicative of an abandoned heart, and injurious to the morals, that no one can question the
propriety of punishing it.”).
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cian James Sullivan wrote, “which restraint . . . may advance the interest and security, and promote the happiness of the whole, . . . they have a right to lay it.”68
In this limited respect, he noted, “opinion[s] may, and ought to be restrained.”69
At the same time, however, the Founders also prized open debate and recognized the harms of suppressing political and religious dissent.70 Consequently,
well-intentioned statements were privileged, at least regarding matters of public
concern. “[E]very citizen,” Pennsylvania judge Thomas McKean explained in
1788, enjoys “a right of investigating the conduct of those who are entrusted with
the public business.”71 But that privilege, as renowned New York jurist James
Kent observed, only applied when a speaker communicated “with good motives,
and for justifiable ends.”72 This common-law rule went beyond the ban on prior
restraints by oﬀering a limited right against subsequent punishments,73 reflecting a belief that vibrant public debate was essential to maintaining an informed
citizenry.74 In these ways, then, Founding Era law was protective of diﬀerent
views.
The basic paradigm of expressive freedom, however, was one of toleration,
not neutrality.75 So long as the government adhered to fundamental common68.

SULLIVAN, supra note 64, at 39.

69.

Id. at 38.
Concerns about self-dealing and arbitrary rule were core to constitutional thinking during
this era. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 110-18 (1989). Relatedly, writers recognized that government oﬃcials were
not “infallible” and might act for “short-sighted, and perhaps [self-]interested” reasons. 3
JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS; OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS,
AND ABUSES 247 (London, Edward and Charles Dilly 1775); see also Campbell, supra note 53,
at 533-34 (discussing these concerns).
Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); see Campbell, supra note 25, at 28087; ALEXANDER HAMILTON MODERNIZES ANDREW HAMILTON’S DEFENSE OF ZENGER (PEOPLE
V. CROSWELL, 1804), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON: EARLY
AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN THEORIES 377, 379 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966) (“The liberty of the
press consisted in publishing with impunity, truth with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
whether it related to men or to measures.”); Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 270 (Pa. 1805)
(“It is no infraction of the law to publish temperate investigations of the nature and forms of
government . . . [but not] those which are plainly accompanied with a criminal intent . . . .”).
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 394 (N.Y. 1804) (Kent, J.). For further discussion of
subsequent case law applying this privilege, see infra notes 105-118 and accompanying text.
See Campbell, supra note 25, at 280-87 (discussing how Founding Era speech and press freedoms encompassed more than just the rule against prior restraints).
This was a staple of Founding Era thought, including among proponents of the Sedition Act.
See id. at 283-86.
To my knowledge, Founding Era debates did not address the validity of wholly incidental
restrictions on speech. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of

70.

71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

879

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

law rules—the ban on prior restraints and the privilege of speaking on matters
of public concern—non-neutral restrictions of speech were acceptable when necessary to promote the public good. For instance, sedition laws could and did target only false and malicious attacks on the government and its oﬃcials, not statements supporting the government or attacks on others.76 Blasphemy laws could
and did target only attacks on Christianity, not pro-Christian messages or attacks on other religions.77 In addition to being facially discriminatory, these laws
were premised on limiting the spread of dangerous ideas.78
Of course, not everyone supported sedition and blasphemy laws.79 But their
reasons almost never included an insistence on neutrality. Most critics of the Sedition Act of 1798, for instance, accepted the legality of sedition prosecutions but
argued that they had to take place at the state level.80 That was Thomas Jeﬀerson’s position.81 A much smaller group favored a broader right of toleration, arguing that speech on matters of public concern should receive nearly absolute
protection.82 These arguments presupposed that people have diverse views, that

76.

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) (discussing the treatment of incidental
restrictions on religious exercise). This Article does not speculate on how the Founders might
have addressed that issue. Rather, my point is that they did not embrace a categorical or even
presumptive ban on content-based restrictions or on eﬀorts to shape public thought.
See, e.g., Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596; see also Campbell, supra note 53, at 530 n.49
(collecting scholarship recognizing the legality of sedition laws). But most Founders opposed
earlier aspects of the English law of seditious libel. For an excellent survey, see David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,
37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985).
See, e.g., Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 405, 409 (Pa. 1824); cf. Wesley
J. Campbell, Religious Neutrality in the Early Republic, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 311, 337-38 (2012)
(noting that early blasphemy cases “reveal a marked preference for an individual liberty conception of religious freedom rather than one based on governmental neutrality”). For longer
treatments of blasphemy law, see Note, Blasphemy and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 135 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2021); Sarah Barringer Gordon, Blasphemy and the Law of Religious Liberty in Nineteenth-Century America, 52 AM. Q. 682 (2000); LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 401-23
(1993); and BLUMBERG, supra note 47, at 318-37.
See, e.g., People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 297-98 (N.Y. 1811).
See BLUMBERG, supra note 47, at 322 (noting “isolated and ineﬀective dissent” against blasphemy laws).
See Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 SUP.
CT. REV. 109, 129-35.
See Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeﬀersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 694-99 (1998).
See, e.g., TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY OF
THE PRESS 150 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2003) (1800) (“The reasoning of the present work
will be exclusively confined to a consideration of the eﬀects of Misrepresentations in public or
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citizens enjoyed a right to state their opinions, and that the government should
act only in the public interest, without deliberate self-dealing.83 None of these
arguments, however, embraced neutrality.
But a few people did. Some insisted that the government should have no
authority to regulate opinions—including their dissemination.84 Everyone generally agreed that the government could not punish people for what they believed and that changing the way people thought was not a valid end of government.85 For some advocates, however, categorical limits on the means and ends
of governmental authority extended beyond internal matters of belief. Instead,
the entire field of opinion was wholly beyond state authority, except to protect
against direct violations of the rights of others.86 A “perfect neutrality” among

83.

84.

85.

86.

political transactions.”); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 91, 236 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 1999) (denying that “the constituent can be restrained in any manner from
speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the conduct
of those who may advise or execute it”); GEORGE HAY, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS,
SHEWING, THAT THE REQUISITION OF SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR FROM LIBELLERS, IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF VIRGINIA 7, 26-28 (Richmond,
Samuel Pleasants, Jr. 1803) (speech on “matters of public concern” should not trigger criminal
liability); see also HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED TO THE REPUBLICAN PRINTERS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES
(Philadelphia, Aurora Oﬃce 1799).
See, e.g., JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS OF
THE PRESS, AND THE UNCONTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 20 (New York, Johnson
& Stryker 1801) (“[Expressive freedom presupposes that] a great variety of opposite opinions
must occur. It also presupposes that the people would pass their judgment upon the proceedings of Congress.”). On political-entrenchment concerns, see Campbell, supra note 53, at 547,
555-56, 561. Notably, these premises about expressive freedom were not in dispute. See Campbell, supra note 25, at 284-86; Campbell, supra note 53, at 552-54. But Republicans accurately
recognized that Federalists used the Sedition Act to punish constitutionally privileged statements. See Campbell, supra note 25, at 283-84.
The chief expositor of this view was the Welsh philosopher Richard Price. See RICHARD PRICE,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE MEANS OF MAKING IT A BENEFIT TO THE WORLD 23-24 (London, 1784). Virginia jurist St. George Tucker later
repeated Price’s argument. See TUCKER, supra note 82, at 376-77; see also DEBATES IN THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, IN DECEMBER, 1798, ON RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE HOUSE
ON THE ACTS OF CONGRESS, CALLED THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 7 (Richmond, Collins &
Co. 1829) (remarks of John Taylor) (“The right of opinion . . . should be held sacred. . . . [The
Creator] deemed it a sacrilege for Government to undertake to regulate the mind of man. It
was a subject by no means within its powers.”).
See supra notes 57-59, 63-64; see also TUCKER, supra note 82, at 371-72 (advocating for an absolute “right of personal opinion . . . in all speculative matters, whether religious, philosophical, or political” ).
See PRICE, supra note 84, at 23-24, 46; TUCKER, supra note 82, at 375-77.
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ideas was preferable, Richard Price wrote, with government “aim[ing] at nothing but keeping the peace . . . .”87
Reasoning along these lines had some influence in Founding Era debates
about governmental power to promote religion.88 But categorical denials of state
power over expression were vanishingly rare.89 Nor should this be surprising.
The jurisdictional separation of civil and religious aﬀairs that grounded liberal
views of religious freedoms reinforced the government’s role in advancing public
morality through non-religious means.90 Moreover, neutrality actually ran directly against the more prevalent strand of liberal thought. On this view, speechrestrictive regulations were allowed, but the government should avoid using
broad and overinclusive prohibitions and instead punish only those communicative acts that were socially harmful.91 In the late 1780s, for example, Pennsylvanians argued that public morals should be preserved through targeted suppression of immoral plays rather than by banning all theater performances. “To
regulate the theatre—every thing that has an immoral tendency should be prohibited,” one writer insisted, noting that “every exceptionable play, now extant,
should be altered, or rejected, and none but those that have the good of mankind
for their object, should be acted.”92 The modern focus on content and viewpoint

87.

88.

89.

90.
91.

92.
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PRICE, supra note 84, at 24. Additionally, in some contexts the term “free press” referred to a
norm that printers publish materials reflecting diﬀerent views. This norm was akin to a common-carrier obligation. See ROBERT W. T. MARTIN, THE FREE AND OPEN PRESS: THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PRESS LIBERTY, 1640-1800, at 3 (2001).
See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About Equal
Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 339; Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian
Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245, 259-60 (1990).
See Campbell, supra note 53, at 530-31 (noting the wide acceptance of carefully circumscribed
bans on seditious libel, even among more liberal writers). What is often called the “libertarian” strand of Founding Era thought focused on a broad reading of the right to discuss public
aﬀairs, not a right against any content-based or viewpoint-based restrictions of expression.
See supra note 79. For an astute study of how these republican ideas informed Founding Era
views about seditious libel, see Rabban, supra note 76.
See WEST, supra note 59, at 207; Hamburger, supra note 88, at 312.
Canonical defenses of speech and press freedoms insisted on curtailing only harmful expression and opposed categorically banning all unlicensed publishing or all speech on public affairs. See Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same Is Inseparable from Publick Liberty (1720), reprinted in 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 110, 110-11 (Ronald
Hamowy ed., 1995); THOMAS HAYTER, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS CHIEFLY AS IT
RESPECTS PERSONAL SLANDER 18 (London, J. Raymond 2d ed. 1755); see also Eric Nelson, “True
Liberty”: Isocrates and Milton’s Areopagitica, 40 MILTON STUD. 201, 211-12 (2001) (noting the
same feature of John Milton’s attack on prior restraints).
Arguments in Favour of the Drama, Letter from a Gentleman in Lancaster, to His Friend in This
City, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 10, 1789, at 2.

the emergence of neutrality

neutrality, by contrast, flips this approach. Today, laws targeting harmful views
are more suspect.93
B. The Next Century
At least in its basic outlines, the law of expressive freedom remained stable
throughout the nineteenth century.94 As was true at the Founding, expressive
freedom entailed specific common-law rules—particularly the rule against prior
restraints and the privilege of speaking in good faith on public matters—along
with the general natural-rights principle that the government could act only to
promote the common good. Neutrality was still missing from the discussion. If
anything, the regulability of socially harmful speech became more engrained in
the nineteenth century.95
At the federal level, controversies in the Antebellum period about the law of
expressive freedom focused on whether Congress had any power to restrict expression. The most prominent episode, for instance, involved a proposal to suppress abolitionist literature by prohibiting access to the federal mails. Some
thought that this limit was within congressional power.96 Others thought that
the First Amendment categorically withdrew all federal power over speech.97 An
intermediate group advocated federal reliance on state law to determine which

93.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
This claim is not meant to deny diversity at particular times, or shifts across time, respecting
the specifics of doctrine. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 601, 627 (1990) (noting “many local and chronological variations”). See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 567-80 (2006) (discussing diversity within the common law tradition). In my view, however, there is no evidence
of a conceptual shift toward a more “libertarian” approach to speech and press rights by the
mid-nineteenth century. But see Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony:
Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 492 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, Beyond
Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 449, 466-67 (2009).
95. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 152-55 (1996); GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 154-68 (2017).
96. See Clement Eaton, Censorship of the Southern Mails, 48 AM. HIST. REV. 266, 270 (1943).
94.

97.

See, e.g., Richard R. John, Hiland Hall’s “Report on Incendiary Publications”: A Forgotten Nineteenth Century Defense of the Freedom of the Press, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 94, 102 (1997) (“Unlike
modern libertarians, Hall freely conceded that the individual states retained a broad measure
of authority to censor publications that they deemed injurious. While such a concession might
seem strange today, it was taken-for-granted in the early republic that powers prohibited to
the federal government might well be reserved to the states.”).

883

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

publications could be suppressed.98 None of these positions centered around
neutrality.99
At the state level, debates in this period also did not turn on neutrality. When
Southern states egregiously suppressed abolitionist advocacy,100 for instance, Republicans responded by defending the inviolability of “freedom of speech and of
the press, on this and every other subject of domestic and national policy. . . .”101
Yet it was hardly an innovation to say that Americans should not be punished
simply for speaking in good faith about public aﬀairs. The proponents of the
Sedition Act had agreed with that proposition.102 Republicans were protesting
Southern noncompliance with widely accepted rights.
Traditional views of speech and press freedoms remained in place after the
Civil War, too. The rule against prior restraints continued to ensure that the people themselves, through legislatures and juries, would mark the limits of expressive freedom.103 And although less noticed by scholars,104 the privilege of speaking and publishing on matters of public concern continued to provide a bounded
98.

99.

100.
101.

102.
103.

104.
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See 12 REG. DEB. app. at 74 (1836).
An essay by William Leggett seems to provide the closest case of support for a neutrality principle. See William Leggett, The Abolitionists, EVENING POST, Aug. 8, 1835, reprinted in 2 A COLLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT, SELECTED AND ARRANGED, WITH
A PREFACE BY THEODORE SEDGWICK, JR. 10-11 (Charles Gregg ed., Arno Press 1970) (1840)
(“If the Government once begins to discriminate as to what is orthodox and what is heterodox
in opinion, what is safe and what is unsafe in its tendency, farewell, a long farewell to our
freedom.”). Early postal laws were non-neutral in important respects, see Genevieve Lakier,
The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2299, 2309-16 (2021),
but federal law barred the Postmaster from discriminating, see Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Oﬃce Policy Shaped Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 711-12, 716 (2006). The Supreme Court later upheld Post Oﬃce authority “to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877).
See CURTIS, supra note 14, at 132.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 2321 (1860) (proposal of Sen. James Harlan); see also, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 205 (1860) (remarks of Rep. Owen Lovejoy)
(discussing Southern violations of expressive freedom). Moreover, evidence indicates that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed in part to provide federal protection for speech and
press freedoms. See AMAR, supra note 53, at 137-294; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 42-71, 91, 129-30 (1986);
KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 155-61, 204-10 (2014).
See Campbell, supra note 25, at 283.
This understanding of expressive freedom is highlighted in cases denying judicial power to
enjoin speech. See, e.g., People v. Most, 64 N.E. 175, 178 (N.Y. 1902); Flint v. Hutchinson
Smoke-Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo. 1892); Dailey v. Superior Ct., 44 P. 458, 459 (Cal.
1896).
See Rabban, supra note 15, at 562-72.

the emergence of neutrality

right of toleration.105 As one treatise put it, “[e]very person has a right to comment on matters of public interest and general concern, provided he does so
fairly and with an honest purpose.”106 This was, as one court noted, “the universal rule.”107 It applied both in civil and criminal cases.108 And although jurists
sometimes disagreed about the scope of the privilege, they widely recognized its
existence and constitutional status.109

105.

106.
107.
108.

109.

See, e.g., Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 377 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting); Winston v. English,
44 How. Pr. 398, 409-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873); Gilman v. McClatchy, 44 P. 241, 243 (Cal. 1896);
Miner v. Post & Tribune Co., 13 N.W. 773, 775 (Mich. 1882); Diener v. Star-Chronicle Pub.
Co., 132 S.W. 1143, 1148-49 (Mo. 1910); Cooper v. People ex rel. Wyatt, 22 P. 790, 797-98
(Colo. 1889) (opinion of Hayt, J.). See generally ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC
POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS §§ 471-479 (1904) (analyzing speech and press freedoms). To be sure, there were suggestions that constitutional protections for expressive freedom were limited to the rule against prior restraints. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado ex rel.
Att’y Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also Thomas Raeburn White, Constitutional
Provisions Guaranteeing Freedom of the Press in Pennsylvania, 52 AM. L. REG. 1, 6 (1904) (noting,
though rejecting, the argument that the rule against prior restraints was the only constitutionally recognized common-law protection for expressive freedom).
MARTIN L. NEWELL & MASON H. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 516 (4th ed. 1924).
Diener, 132 S.W. at 1149.
For civil cases, see cases cited supra note 105. For criminal cases, see, for example, State v.
McKee, 46 A. 409, 413 (Conn. 1900); State v. Fish, 102 A. 378, 378 (N.J. 1917); State ex rel.
Haskell v. Faulds, 42 P. 285, 287-88 (Mont. 1895); and Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 Pa. D. 565,
568 (Ct. of the Quarter Sessions of the Peace 1892). An honest purpose was generally required
in criminal cases, but the truth was usually a complete defense in tort cases. See Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 789, 790-805 (1964). Crucially, however, the rule that truthful statements do not give
rise to civil liability was not premised on the rights of speakers. Rather, it was formulated because the rights of plaintiﬀs were not abridged by truthful statements. See, e.g., Alderman v.
French, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 1, 2-3 (1822); BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN; WITH A COMMENTARY ON STATE RIGHTS, AND ON THE CONSTITUTION AND POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES 253 (Books for Libraries Press 1970) (1832); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 15, 21 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1827).
See supra notes 105-108; infra notes 113-118. For judicial decisions from the Antebellum period,
see BLUMBERG, supra note 47, at 341-49, though readers should note that Blumberg mistakenly
treats speech and press freedoms as limited to the rule against prior restraints, without also
emphasizing the privilege of speaking in good faith on matters of public concern. For later
judicial decisions, see RABBAN, supra note 14, at 129-76. For a recent study of the truth defense
in the nineteenth century, see Sandra Davidson, The Rocky Road to Truth as a Defense: Libel
Construction in the Nineteenth Century, in AN INDISPENSABLE LIBERTY: THE FIGHT FOR FREE
SPEECH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 135-60 (Mary M. Cronin ed., 2016), though readers should note that Davidson does not recognize the important distinction between using
truth to undermine a plaintiﬀ ’s claim of reputational injury and using truth to further a defendant’s assertion of constitutional privilege. See supra note 108.
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Delineating what counted as a matter of public concern was not easy.110 One
leading treatise defined matters of public concern as “[a]ll political, legal, and
ecclesiastical matters.”111 But this was just a crude summary. For instance, discussion of grand-jury proceedings (certainly a “legal” matter) was not included,
but the privilege did extend to criticisms of art, literature, and theater performances, regardless of any political, legal, or ecclesiastical content.112 Judges
mostly located the boundaries of the category by looking to the common law.
This entailed heavy reliance on earlier decisions,113 as well as reference to the
underlying rationales of speech and press freedoms when the existing case law
was unclear.114 But judges sometimes made ipse dixit declarations about what
matters were suitable for public discussion, or they deferred to legislative judgments.115

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.
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This Article makes no claim about the uniformity, stability, or coherence of this category. See
supra note 94. My goal is simply to recover the basic outlines of how American jurists viewed
the law of expressive freedom.
See W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER; WITH THE EVIDENCE,
PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE, BOTH IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, AND PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS 40 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881); see also D. M. Mickey, Libel, in 13 THE AMERICAN
AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 329 (Northport, Edward Thompson Co. 1890) (repeating this phrase). Doctrine often treated “comment[ing] on matters of public interest” as distinct from making statements of fact. See ODGERS, supra, at 32-33. For a concise summary, see
David A. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. PITT. L. REV.
493, 501-04 (1990).
See ODGERS, supra note 111, at 41; THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 561-63 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1883). For discussion of the
changes made in Cooley’s fifth edition, see NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST
MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 181-82 (1986).
Reflecting its general-law status, contemporary treatises typically cited English and American
cases to delineate this category. See, e.g., NEWELL, supra note 106, at 643-724. Most cases related to civil defamation suits, but the constitutional dimension of the freedom of speech was
well recognized in criminal cases as well. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 91 A. 586, 587-88 (N.J. 1914);
State v. Fox, 127 P. 1111, 1112 (Wash. 1912); People v. Most, 64 N.E. 175, 178 (N.Y. 1902).
See, e.g., Briggs v. Garrett, 2 A. 513, 523 (Pa. 1886). Historical and purposive reasoning was
also used to construe the rule against prior restraints. See, e.g., Cowan v. Fairbrother, 24 S.E.
212, 215 (N.C. 1896); Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 158 N.W. 358, 359 (Neb. 1916). Notably, what
we would now identify as purposive arguments tended to be more circumscribed. See Samuel
L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. 967, 997-99 (2021) (comparing and contrasting the
traditional “mischief rule” with modern purposivism).
See, e.g., State v. Pioneer Press Co., 110 N.W. 867, 868-69 (Minn. 1907) (“[I]f, in the opinion
of the Legislature, it is detrimental to public morals to publish anything more than the mere
fact that the execution has taken place, then, under the authorities and upon principle, the
appellant was not deprived of any constitutional right in being so limited.”). Sometimes, however, courts mentioned that legislative judgments were constrained by “the standard of the
common law.” Most, 64 N.E. at 178.

the emergence of neutrality

The intent requirement further underscores the non-neutral limits on speech
and press freedoms. Speech on matters of public concern was privileged, but
such speech could not be aimed at undermining the public good.116 And the values used to make that assessment were societal values, not ones determined by
the speaker.117 Thus, as Robert Post observes, the privilege “carried within it a
strong normative sense of the proper spirit in which public discussion should be
conducted.”118 Speech and press freedoms were protective of diﬀerent views on
matters of public concern, but they did not demand viewpoint neutrality in the
modern sense of disallowing speech restrictions designed to promote public morality or otherwise shape the way that people think. The privilege guaranteed
toleration within socially defined bounds, not neutrality.
From a modern perspective, it may seem puzzling that the procedural and
substantive dimensions of the law of expressive freedom were specified mostly
by the common law. Today, common-law decisions are generally treated as ordinary law, not as constitutional law. Indeed, a leading critique of Lochner-era jurisprudence is that the Supreme Court erred by conflating common-law rights
and constitutional rights.119 Moreover, today, we usually think of the common
law as decisional law that varies from state to state.120 But these are modern ideas
that emerged later in the twentieth century. For much of American history, jurists understood the common law as a variant of general law and viewed many

116.

117.

118.

119.
120.

See, e.g., Riley v. Lee, 11 S.W. 713, 714 (Ky. 1889) (requiring “good motive”); Briggs, 2 A. at 521
(Pa. 1886) (requiring “proper motive”); see also Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad
Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366, 1389 (2016) (“[T]he good intentions were seen as the exculpating element, and truth was an evidence of those intentions.”).
See, e.g., State v. Van Wye, 37 S.W. 938, 939 (Mo. 1896) (“In a government of law, the lawmaking power must be recognized as the proper authority to define the boundary line between
license and licentiousness; and it must likewise remain the province of the jury—the constitutional triers of the fact—to determine when that boundary has been passed.” (quotations
omitted)).
Robert C. Post, Defaming Public Oﬃcials: On Doctrine and Legal History, 12 AM. BAR FOUND.
RSCH. J. 539, 552 (1987) (reviewing ROSENBERG, supra note 112); see also Post, supra note 94,
at 627-29 (discussing the connection between the privilege and civility norms); Lindsay Rogers, Federal Interference with the Freedom of the Press, 23 YALE L.J. 559, 574 (1914) (same). Some
commentators recognized the need for greater subtlety in defining malicious intent in order
to preserve vibrant public discourse, but even these more liberal interpretations of the privilege did not extend to expression undertaken with criminal intent. See, e.g., FREUND, supra
note 105, § 476.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-66 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Cass
R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874-75 (1987).
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). For an introduction to general law, see
Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1261-65 (2017).
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(but not all) common-law rules as fundamental in status.121 These were, as one
court put it, “general principle[s] . . . of universal application in all free governments.”122
Finally, the government could restrict expression only to promote the public
good. But in contrast to courts’ enforcement of common-law protections, they
rarely struck down legislation as not advancing the public good.123 Speech and
press freedoms did not prevent the government from restricting expression in
new ways.124 Nor was neutrality required. “[T]here is no doubt,” Ernst Freund
noted in his treatise, “that speech and press may not be used to corrupt public
morals, and obscene or profane utterances by word of mouth, in writing or in
print may be made punishable oﬀenses.”125 As we will see, however, courts were
becoming more active in other contexts, enforcing limits on legislative power.

121.

See Gienapp, supra note 50, at 340-42; Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681, 805-07 (1997). Notably, all Supreme Court Justices in the
late nineteenth century shared this understanding of general fundamental rights, despite disagreeing about the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Jud Campbell, Constitutional Rights Before Realism, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1433, 1443-46.
122. Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H. 304, 335 (1859) (Sargent, J.). On this view, speech and press freedoms had the same meaning under state and federal constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741, 743 (1882); FREUND, supra note 105,
at § 471; WILLIAM G. HALE, THE LAW OF THE PRESS: TEXT, STATUTES, AND CASES 273 (1923);
see also G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 62 (2005) (“Both
sets of rights were given comparable solicitude . . . .”).
123. An illustration is “service letter” laws, which required employers to provide terminated employees with a written explanation for their termination. See Note, The Service Letter Laws, 36
HARV. L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1922). Some courts declared these laws unconstitutional on free
speech grounds because, in their view, the laws did not advance a public interest. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co., 22 S.E. 579, 579-80 (Ga. 1894); Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown, 102 P. 459, 460-61 (Kan. 1909); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Griﬃn, 171 S.W.
703, 705 (Tex. 1914). Other courts, however, upheld these statutes because of legislative leeway to restrict speech to promote the public good. See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Griﬃn,
154 S.W. 583, 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), rev’d, 171 S.W. 703 (Tex. 1914); Chi., Rock Island & P.
Ry. Co. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548, 555 (1922). For another example of speech-restrictive legislation
struck down using general police-powers analysis, see Ex parte Kearny, 55 Cal. 212, 225 (1880).
124. See State v. McKee, 46 A. 409, 411 (Conn. 1900).
125.
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FREUND, supra note 105, at § 472; see also, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)
(“publications injurious to public morals”); State v. McKee, 46 A. 409, 414 (Conn. 1900)
(“contagion of moral diseases”); JAMES PATERSON, THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, SPEECH, AND
PUBLIC WORSHIP: BEING COMMENTARIES ON THE LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT AND THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 5 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1880) (“[A]nother limit to free speech and writing is
Immorality.”).

the emergence of neutrality

C. Enforcing Natural Rights
From the Founding through the beginning of the twentieth century, it was
axiomatic that the government could only act to promote the public good. On
this view, the government could regulate rights to advance genuine public aims,
but it could not “subvert the rights themselves” by restricting them without a
public end in view.126 Despite agreement on this point, virulent debates raged
over whether and how judges should enforce this principle.127 Some commentators denied that judges had any such power,128 but others insisted that judges
should recognize the invalidity of legislative acts that aimed to promote private
interests at the expense of the general welfare.129
For the nation’s first century, courts did not view general limits on state police powers as questions of federal law.130 But toward the end of the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court shifted course. Rights “must be exercised subject to
such general rules as are adopted by society for the common welfare,” the Court
explained in one of the mid-1880s challenges to San Francisco’s discriminatory

126.

127.

128.

129.

130.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also
Campbell, supra note 25, at 275 (discussing the distinction between regulating and abridging
rights). Justice Bradley was in dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, but he captured a common
premise of American constitutionalism that the majority also embraced, although not as federal constitutional law. See Campbell, supra note 121, at 1444-47.
The classic citation is Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798), in which Justices Chase
and Iredell debated whether judges could enforce “the great first principles of the social compact,” as Chase put it. For an important clarification about the scope of Chase’s argument, see
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 42-43 (2004).
For discussion and sources recognizing limits to this ends-means analysis, see HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62-63 (1897). Some took an extremely narrow view of the ends-means test. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The adjudged cases in which statutes have been held to be
void, because unreasonable, are those in which the means employed by the legislature were
not at all germane to the end to which the legislature was competent.”).
For perhaps the most famous exposition of this view in the context of property rights, see
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 354-58 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 7th ed. 1906) (1871).
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36. The scope of the police powers did sometimes come up
in cases involving, for instance, state power to regulate commerce and contracts. See Ilan
Wurman, The Origins of Substantive Due Process, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 837-52 (2020). Courts
also enforced limitations arising out of principles of general fundamental law in diversity
cases. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1288 (2000).
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laundry regulations.131 The thrust of these decisions was that legislatures had to
consider everyone’s interests impartially, without favoring some classes of persons over others. Equality was essential. But this principle did not rigidly restrict
state power.132 The liberty being protected, the Court explained, was “liberty
regulated by just and impartial laws.”133
Not surprisingly, a public-good requirement proved diﬃcult to administer.
In Soon Hing v. Crowley, for example, the challengers insisted that an ordinance
was grounded on “antipathy and hatred” toward Chinese immigrants.134 As a
theoretical matter, such discrimination was patently unlawful. Writing for the
majority, however, Justice Field responded that “courts cannot inquire into the
motives of the legislators in passing [statutes], except as they may be disclosed
on the face of the acts, or infer[a]ble from their operation.”135 Legislatures had
to pursue valid public objectives, but judges could not directly enforce this rule.
“The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into
the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile,” Field explained.136 Instead, the invidious or arbitrary
character of legislation needed to be evident through its design or operation.137
In the decades that followed, the Supreme Court struggled simultaneously
to enforce the public-good requirement and to maintain formalist modes of legal
analysis. In case after case, the Court recognized state authority to regulate liberty and property to advance the general welfare.138 And it noted that assessing

131.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

138.
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Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 709 (1885). The quotation referred to the “right of work,”
but the point applied to other natural rights. See infra note 138. For background, see David E.
Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 232-41
(1999).
The Court was not suggesting that all laws had to operate with perfect formal equality. See
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S 27, 31-32 (1885).
Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 709.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id. at 711.
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372-74 (1886). See generally Caleb Nelson, Judicial
Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1812-35 (2008) (surveying judicial inquiries into legislative purpose from 1870 to 1930).
See, e.g., Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
53 (1905). The Court also articulated a principle of deference to state-court judgments regarding “whether [legislation] is well calculated to promote the general and public welfare . . . .”
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909). For surveys of these cases, see HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE & DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 19-61 (1995); and 2 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE 1920S, at 349-548 (1st ed. 2016).
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the public good was quintessentially a legislative task—not a judicial one.139
Nonetheless, as Justice Harlan observed in Mugler v. Kansas, judges had a role in
ensuring that legislative claims to promote the public good were not “mere pretences.”140 The path forward, he proposed, was for judges to ensure that the legislation was “fairly adapted” to a legitimate end.141
Using this ends-means test, the Justices sporadically invalidated statutes.
The most famous example, of course, was Lochner v. New York, which overturned
a state law limiting the working hours of bakers.142 Generally, however, the
Court took a deferential approach to reviewing statutes.143 The stated goal of the
ends-means test was to ensure that legislatures had acted within the scope of
their powers—not to reevaluate their judgments.144 Nor did the test purport to
limit the range of public-regarding interests that the government could pursue.145
In addition to an ends-means test, judges also identified categories of laws
that were deemed not to promote the public interest. These decisions usually
relied on common-law traditions or ipse dixit statements about the boundaries of
governmental power.146 When holding that state and local governments must

139.

140.
141.
142.

143.

144.

145.

146.

See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
123 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 662.
198 U.S. 45. Another famous example was Meyer v. Nebraska, which held that a statute requiring children to be taught in English “is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end
within the competency of the State.” 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY,
1888-1986, at 102-04 (1990); see also MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND
REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S, at 31-62 (2001) (arguing
that the Court’s substantive due-process jurisprudence during the Lochner era was more deferential than is conventionally assumed). Judicial invalidations of statutes escalated in the
1920s. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 772 (2009).
See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86
GEO. L.J. 813, 835 (1998) (“These police power cases thus turned on the use of a formalist,
categorical rule: if the end were to promote health, safety, or morality and if the means were
suited to the end, the statute was valid.”); see also Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3
RSCH. L. & SOCIO. 3, 6-8 (1980) (explaining how this approach was grounded in classical
legal thought); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 23-36 (1991) (same).
To be sure, questions remained over what sorts of aims promoted the public interest. See, e.g.,
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1915) (stating that “removal of . . . inequalities” cannot
be an end in and of itself “without [some] other object in view”); see also Siegel, supra note
144, at 8-12 (discussing debates over paternalism).
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925).
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compensate property owners for takings, for instance, the Court emphasized the
fundamentality of that principle at common law.147 In another line of cases, the
Court limited the ability of governments to regulate businesses not “aﬀected” or
“clothed” with a public interest.148 Such eﬀorts to classify “public” and “private”
realms were common at that time.149
To summarize, Lochner-era Fourteenth Amendment decisions featured a
general ends-means test alongside a set of more specific categorical rules circumscribing legislative power. In this way, Fourteenth Amendment doctrine paralleled the law of expressive freedom, which recognized an overarching publicgood requirement alongside specific rules that banned prior restraints and that
privileged well-intentioned speech on matters of public concern. For the time
being, natural rights and common-law rights were still the twin pillars of fundamental-rights jurisprudence.
ii. a changing legal landscape
As the Lochner era continued, profound changes were taking shape in attitudes about law. “Legal realism” was emerging.150 But studies of First Amendment law usually omit these jurisprudential developments. Instead, they typically describe the flowering of expressive freedom as a story of Whiggish
progress: the seeds of contemporary doctrine were planted in the famous dissents of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, they began to germinate in the

147.

See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-36 (1897); see also
Treanor, supra note 144, at 832 (recognizing the anachronism of describing this decision in
terms of “incorporation”).
148. For one of the leading cases in this series, see Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 431
(1927). For a discussion of this category, emphasizing how businesses aﬀected with a public
interest could still be regulated by law, see generally William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea
and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
139, 139-76 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017). The Court retreated from
this view in Nebbia v. New York, stating that “[i]t is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses aﬀected with a public interest . . . .” 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
149. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 477-95 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986)).
150. Given the diﬀerent meanings of “realism,” this Article generally avoids that label and instead
uses the term “functionalism.” For uses of the term “realism” to describe changes in the internal perspective, see, for example, LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
13-14 (1996); and William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of
Legal Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 795, 799 & n.36 (2004).
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1930s, and—except for a temporary withering in the 1950s—they steadily ascended into their natural form. And how could it have been otherwise? The very
essence of expressive freedom, the thinking goes, is neutrality.151
This traditional narrative is a myth. Content and viewpoint neutrality were
not there from the start. Ideas that resembled these concepts were present, so tracing a superficial chain of title back to the beginning is not hard to do. Some notions of equality were there. But deceptive resemblances can obscure our ability
to understand the past. Modern principles, it turns out, emerged only after several decades of doctrinal twists and turns.
Jurisprudential shifts were crucial to this story and need to be brought to the
fore, focusing particularly on how jurists revised and blended the natural-rights
and common-law-rights traditions. In short, rights jurisprudence and the “law
of interpretation” were both changing.152 This Part begins with a summary of
these broader developments, which will then enable us to see that Justice
Holmes, Justice Brandeis, and their intellectual heirs did not construct First
Amendment doctrine from scratch. Their innovations were transformative, but
more through a process of reinterpretation than wholesale invention.153 And
once early developments are understood in this way, the absence of neutrality
becomes even clearer.
A. The Fall of Natural Rights
The new jurisprudential turn toward functionalism responded to perceived
flaws in what scholars often call “classical legal thought.”154 When Justice

151.

A particularly stark example is Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26 (1975) (“Although the principle of equal liberty of expression is inherent in the [F]irst [A]mendment, it has only recently received full and explicit
articulation in an opinion of the Supreme Court.”).
152. See generally William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1082 (2017) (“Interpretation isn’t just a matter of language; it’s also governed by law.
This ‘law of interpretation’ determines what a particular instrument ‘means’ in our legal system.”).
153. Cf. White, supra note 14, at 326 (“The categorist dimensions of Brandeis’s methodology in
Whitney suggest that he intended to turn late nineteenth-century orthodox jurisprudence on
its head.”).
154. For summaries of classical legal thought, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 388-93; MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31
(1992); and WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 64-123 (1998). The shift from classical thought to realism
did not represent a clean break. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST
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Holmes famously insisted that law “cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics,”155 his critique was aimed
at a way of thinking about law that purported to be more logical and deductive
than he thought feasible or desirable. As Laura Kalman explains, critics like
Holmes believed it was fallacious to view law “as a system of neutral rules that
judges mechanically applied to reach the one legally ‘correct’ decision.”156 Instead, these critics advanced a new interpretive paradigm that championed the
judge’s responsibility to construe legal rules in light of their social functions.
The foundational work in this tradition was future-Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr.’s The Path of the Law. “[A] body of law,” he explained, “is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and
definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that
end are stated or are ready to be stated in words.”157 Holmes was not saying that
traditions should be ignored. Indeed, he was a positivist who thought that earlier
decisions were constitutive of the law. But law was not an end in itself. Instead,
it was a means to achieving social goals. Inherited legal traditions, Holmes argued, should thus be understood with a “conscious articulate reference to the
end in view.”158
This functional turn in legal interpretation—sometimes described in terms
of the rise of “Progressive Jurisprudence”159—had profound implications for
constitutional law. Most importantly, the functionalists argued for doctrinal evolution, and they embraced a limited form of judicial agency in that “living” process.160 The “living problems in our own land and law,” Benjamin Cardozo argued, required a “method of free decision” in constitutional law that would
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157.
158.
159.
160.
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DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 67-69 (2010) (emphasizing realism’s continuity
with the past). But threads of continuity do not disprove that legal thought changed substantially. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 753 n.18 (2013).
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881);
see also Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 620-23 (1908) (critiquing the formalism of classical jurisprudence).
KALMAN, supra note 150, at 16. See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) (examining the work of legal realist Robert Hale and progressive critiques of laissez-faire constitutionalism and neoclassical law and economics).
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
Id.
Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 497-500 (1996).
See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the
“Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 19192 (1997). The emphasis on “evolution” coincided with broader intellectual developments.
See, e.g., Theodore Schroeder, The Historical Interpretation of “Freedom of Speech and of the
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enable the “great generalities of the constitution [to] have a content and a significance that vary from age to age.”161 His point was not that judges could do
whatever they wanted. “The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free,”
Cardozo cautioned. “He is not to innovate at pleasure.”162 Rather, the method of
free decision, Cardozo argued, “supplements the declaration, and fills the vacant
spaces, by the same processes and methods that have built up the customary
law.”163 Judges still had to interpret and apply the law. But Cardozo was proposing a diﬀerent conception of what that entailed.
This functional perspective called for a diﬀerent approach to the commonlaw strand of rights jurisprudence. Legal rules and traditions, on this view,
needed to be continually reassessed in light of their social functions. “Clauses
guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power,” Justice Brandeis characteristically explained, “must have a . . . capacity of adaptation
to a changing world.”164 Interpretation thus required realistic and reasoned analysis, not dogmatic reliance on the views of the past or ipse dixit declarations about
the nature of things. As Cardozo stated, “[W]hen [judges] are called upon to say
how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare
of society fix the path, its direction and its distance.”165
The functional turn also prompted a new way of thinking about natural
rights. Critics of classical legal thought still accepted that governments could
only act to promote the common good.166 And they acknowledged that judges
could help check legislative abuse using an ends-means test. “[T]he mere fact
that an enactment purports to be for the protection of public safety, health or
morals,” Justice Holmes explained, “is not conclusive upon the courts.”167 Instead

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

166.

167.

Press”—Part I—General Considerations, 70 CENT. L.J. 184, 187-88 (1910) (“In the scientific aspect, our social and political institutions, like all natural phenomena, are but special manifestations of the all-pervading law of evolution.”). See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973)
(discussing how scientific developments impacted socio-political thought, including views of
law).
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 17.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
CARDOZO, supra note 161, at 67. This approach was reflected in many areas of constitutional
law, see, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934), as well as statutory interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940).
See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV.
353, 369 (1916); Walton H. Hamilton, Aﬀectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1111
(1930).
Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608 (1903).
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of abandoning Lochner’s ends-means test, then, the functional strategy combined
deference to legislative judgments, on the one hand,168 and more realistic and
scientific appraisals of competing interests, on the other.169
With these developments, the earlier boundary-setting use of the endsmeans test gave way to an avowedly substantive notion of judicial oversight. In
other words, rather than merely ensuring that legislatures stayed within their
proper domains, the ends-means test became a way of ensuring that legislative
judgments were substantively reasonable.170 Of course, judges needed to approach this task with a profound sense of humility given their institutional limits. But with the rise of evidence-based “sociological jurisprudence,” jurists were
also open to a limited reevaluation of the facts,171 particularly where the original
reasons for legislative intervention had disappeared.172 In these ways, the natural-rights tradition survived, with judicial review continuing to serve as a partial
backstop against arbitrary deprivations of liberty.
Terrified of the ghosts of Lochner, however, progressive proponents of functionalism denounced the idea of natural rights.173 Instead, they incorporated the
public-good requirement into their account of due process.174 None of this had
anything to do with narrowing the types of interests that legislatures could pursue when limiting individual liberty or property. And so, from a practical standpoint, the twin pillars of rights jurisprudence were mostly still intact. But the
lens through which jurists viewed these longstanding principles had begun to
fundamentally change.

168.
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171.
172.
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See Siegel, supra note 144, at 10-11; see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 170-172; see, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45, 67-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Treanor, supra note 144, at 856 (“Holmes’s . . . decisions reworked and restructured the
basic concepts of substantive due process and rejected its formalist approach.”). It should go
without saying that Lochner-era decisions evaluated the substantive reasonableness of legislative judgments, even as judges claimed to merely ensure that legislatures had acted within
their powers. The shift precipitated by the functional turn was to make that reality more explicit in the doctrine.
See, e.g., Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 519-21 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924).
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 346-48 (1915).
Actually, this was not a wholly “progressive” development. The notion that due process required factual review was well recognized by all the Justices. See, e.g., W. & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1929); see also Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and
the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 960 (1927) (“Fortunately, the present tendency is
toward a closer scrutiny of the factual situation and, in the case of certain of the justices, toward a general use of scientific testimony.”). For a discussion of changing conceptions of the
Constitution and the common law during the Lochner era, see Siegel, supra note 144, at 78-90.
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B. Holmes, Brandeis, and the First Amendment
Due-process debates during the Lochner era framed the Court’s earliest interpretations of the First Amendment. Rather than viewing speech and press freedoms in isolation, the Justices approached issues of expressive freedom in much
the same way that they approached other questions relating to fundamental
rights. The core issue in these cases was familiar: how to reconcile governmental
authority to promote the public good with judicial protection for personal rights.
And since the validity of governmental eﬀorts to promote public morality were
still taken for granted, any broad emphasis on neutrality would not have made
any sense. Instead, as we will see, Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis took a
diﬀerent approach, calling on judges to identify case-specific harms before treating speech as unprivileged.
These developments were hardly inevitable. Indeed, progressive legal elites
initially paid little attention to First Amendment issues.175 Nor did the functional
interpretive approach necessarily suggest a more capacious view of expressive
freedom. “[T]he individual interest in free belief and opinion,” Roscoe Pound
wrote in 1915, “must always be balanced with the social interest in the security
of social institutions and the interest of the state in its personality.”176 If speech
“actively disturbs the public peace or shocks the moral feelings of the community,” he continued, “social interests must be weighed over against the individual
interest.”177 Along similar lines, Pound proposed narrowing prior-restraint doctrine.178 Most controversies, however, focused on issues of economic regulation,
not expressive freedom.
A wave of prosecutions initiated during World War I highlighted the persistence of traditional understandings of speech and press rights. “All citizens are
free to express their views on all public questions,” one judge explained at the

175.

For discussion of progressive views of speech rights, see GRABER, supra note 14.
Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality [Concluded], 28 HARV. L. REV. 445, 454 (1915).
177. Id. at 455. Pound even suggested that political speech could be suppressed in extraordinary
circumstances. Id. at 456. He also emphasized, however, the social importance of protecting
“free belief and free expression of opinion as guarantees of political eﬃciency and instruments
of social progress.” Id. at 453.
178. See Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 640, 668 (1916).
176.

897

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

time, “so long as they are actuated by honest purposes . . . .”179 Indeed, the privileged status of speech on public matters was well recognized.180 This rule, however, was not especially protective of speech. In a famous trio of Espionage Act
decisions, for instance, the Supreme Court held that juries could infer malicious
intent if speech on political aﬀairs posed a “clear and present danger” of social
harm.181
After voting to aﬃrm the convictions in these three cases, however, Justice
Holmes noticed a problem. If criticisms of the war tended to cause harm, and if
a jury could infer malicious intent based on that tendency, then the law could
eﬀectively ban criticisms of the war. From a formalist standpoint, this result was
unproblematic. A jury finding of criminal intent was enough to formally negate
the privilege.182 But from a functional standpoint, matters looked diﬀerent. After

179.

Charge to the Jury of United States District Court, Western District of Washington, Relating to Anticonscription Circulars and Meetings Previous to Passage of Selective-Service Act, and Conspiracy
Under Section 6, Penal Code, to Prevent, Hinder, or Delay by Force the Execution of the War Resolution of April 6, 1917, and National-Defense Act (Act of June 3, 1916), in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
INTERPRETATION OF WAR STATUTES: BULLETIN NO. 70, at 1, 8 (1918).
180. See James Parker Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 526, 532 (1921) (noting that
there are “legal precedents in abundance” regarding an intent requirement). Many scholars
have explored Justice Holmes’s views. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis
of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 183 (1982); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of
Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1207-08 (1983); Yosal Rogat &
James M. O’Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion–The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1349, 1350-51 (1984); BRAD SNYDER, THE HOUSE OF TRUTH: A WASHINGTON POLITICAL
SALON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 274-90 (2017). Holmes had already
suggested that it would be an “unjustifiable restriction of liberty” if a statute were “construed
to prevent publications merely because they tend to produce unfavorable opinions of a particular statute or of law in general.” Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); see also Geoﬀrey
R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” Test: Free Speech in Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
411, 447 (“Justice Holmes was not embracing the most extreme version of the bad tendency/constructive intent standard, which essentially equated all criticism of the war with
unlawful intent, but was . . . treating proof of specific intent as a distinct evidentiary requirement.”).
181. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (applying Schenck); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919)
(same). For one of many works emphasizing the initially limited scope of the “clear and present danger” test, see Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
and the Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24
(1971). Moreover, the fact that some of a defendant’s speech might be constitutionally privileged, “being part of a general program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief,”
did not insulate the defendant from liability for unprivileged speech. Debs, 249 U.S. at 215.
182. The Espionage Act of 1917 required specific criminal intent, thus negating any claim of constitutional privilege. See Note, The Espionage Act and the Limits of Legal Toleration, 33 HARV. L.
REV. 442, 442 (1920) [hereinafter Note, The Espionage Act]. It was less clear whether that was
true of the 1918 amendments. Id. at 443.
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all, the government might obtain unwarranted guilty verdicts, and even the mere
threat of prosecution could discourage well-intentioned political speech.183
Justice Holmes addressed this problem in a dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States.184 He began by construing the federal statue at issue as requiring
specific intent to undermine the war eﬀort, not just knowledge that obstruction
might result.185 Holmes then linked this specific-intent element to the freedom
of speech. “It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring
it about,” he explained, “that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.”186 A mere tendency to
cause harm would not make speech unprivileged, he insisted. Rather, absent direct evidence of specific intent, the government had to show that the speech
posed a “clear and imminent danger.”187 In essence, Holmes was articulating a
higher threshold for proving intent.188
In the final two paragraphs of his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes shifted to
a diﬀerent problem. “[E]ven if what I think the necessary intent were shown,”
he observed, “the most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could
be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suﬀer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow.”189 And on that issue, Holmes
took a nearly absolutist position, asserting that “no one has a right even to consider [a person’s creed] in dealing with the charges before the Court.” Holmes
defended this principle in a famous concluding paragraph:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical . . . . But [the theory of the Constitution is] that the ultimate good

183.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

189.

See Stone, supra note 180, at 448-49 (discussing Zechariah Chafee’s recognition of this problem); Rabban, supra note 180, at 1281 (discussing Ernst Freund’s recognition of this problem).
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, later emphasized the judicial responsibility to ensure that juries were “judging in calmness.” See Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 483
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 626-27 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 627.
This focus on intent underscores that Justice Holmes was not proposing “radical revisions of
prevailing law,” as some scholars have suggested. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 892 (1986); see also Leslie Kendrick,
Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1262-63 (2014) (describing Holmes’s
dissent in Abrams as having first introduced intent in speech jurisprudence); Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 180, at 1387 (discussing intent and concluding that “one may justifiably doubt
that Holmes had yet worked out a coherent principle of clear and present danger, even for
himself”).
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out . . . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.190
In Holmes’s view, the government could impose punishment only for the harms
that speakers intended and caused,191 not for errors in their beliefs. Speech restrictions thus had to be grounded on particular communicative harms, not
merely on opposition to the ideas themselves. The government could not suppress the dissemination of ideas as such.192
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis further developed this idea in Gitlow v.
New York193 and Whitney v. California.194 Both cases involved challenges to criminal bans on advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Invoking a
qualified privilege of commenting on public aﬀairs,195 the defendants asserted
that states could not categorically forbid advocacy of certain political ideas
190.

191.

192.

193.
194.
195.
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Id. at 616, 630-31.
Thus, for instance, even if Abrams’s speech was unprivileged, he could only be punished for
his contribution to undermining the war eﬀort. Id. at 629; see also Bogen, supra note 180, at 186
(recounting Holmes’s view that proscribable speech not only had to be maliciously intended
but also had to further the unlawful purpose).
See also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (“[T]he First Amendment [prohibits] legislation against free speech as such”). The limits of Justice Holmes’s approach are
illustrated by his vote to aﬃrm in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), upholding a conviction for disrupting military recruitment by advocating pacifism. The speech was designed
to aﬀect recruitment, Justice McKenna concluded, and therefore “[i]t was not an advocacy of
policies or a censure of actions that a citizen had the right to make.” Id. at 333. Unlike the
majority, Justice Brandeis focused on the face of the law rather than Gilbert’s conduct. See id.
at 334-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The law, he wrote, applied regardless of motives and regardless of whether the nation was at war. Its object was “not acts but beliefs.” Id. at 335.
Brandeis’s point was that the law applied regardless of whether a particular speaker’s expression would likely lead to unlawful acts. For further discussion of this idea, see infra notes 193213 and accompanying text.
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
See Brief for Plaintiﬀ-in-Error at 20-21, Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652 (No. 770) (“[E]xpress[ion of]
an idea or proposal relating to government” could be punished when “a substantive evil is
attempted” or the utterance of the words created “a clear and present danger of such substantive evil”). The essence of the defendant’s argument in Gitlow was that the prosecution needed
to make a case-specific showing of harm. An example nicely captured the point: “[T]o approve
assault in a soliloquy is not a crime.” Id. at 32.
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through direct prohibitions or limits on freedom of association.196 The eminent
civil-liberties attorneys in Whitney further argued that the syndicalism statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause by “discriminat[ing] between diﬀering
opinions,” without tying this argument to the First Amendment.197 In both
cases, the majority upheld the convictions based on legislative power to “punish
those who abuse [expressive] freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public
peace.”198 In their view, states could nip dangerous ideas in the bud.199
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis construed the First Amendment more
capaciously than did the majority. Legislatures, they thought, could not outright
ban the dissemination of “social, economic and political” views.200 All ideas,
Holmes insisted in Gitlow, “should be given their chance and have their way.”201
To be sure, speech could be curtailed when necessary “to protect the State from
destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral,” as Brandeis
noted in Whitney.202 But states could not restrict the advocacy of certain ideas

196.

The prosecution in Gitlow relied on the defendant’s own statements, whereas the defendant
in Whitney had associated with a group that had unlawful aims. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 645;
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 364-66.
197. Brief of Plaintiﬀ-in-Error at 80, Whitney, 274 U.S. 357 (No. 3). When noting this argument,
Justice Brandeis’s clerk (and future New Dealer) James Landis observed, “I do not think you
will want to treat [this argument].” Letter from James Landis, Law Clerk, to Louis Brandeis,
J. (Aug. 21, 1926), https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:14737316$147i [https://
perma.cc/L2EX-HY2B]. Another memo, which was unsigned but presumably written by
Brandeis’s subsequent clerk, stated, “Contention that statute denies the equal protection of
the laws in that it strikes those seeking a change and not those seeking to preserve the status
quo certainly needs no mention. It struck at the danger.” Memorandum from Law Clerk to
Louis Brandeis, J. (Oct. 27, 1926), https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:14737316
$273i [https://perma.cc/8R63-UK77].
198. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 667; see also id. at 670 (“[W]hether any specific utterance coming within
the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to
consideration.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371.
199. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669-70. In Whitney, the majority focused on the jury finding of criminal intent as a basis for rejecting the claimed privilege. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366-67.
200. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
201.

Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (invoking the “free trade in ideas” and “competition
of the market”).
202. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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without a case-specific showing that the speech was unprivileged. Rather, speakers could only be punished for the particular communicative harms that they
intended and caused.203 Ideas as such were protected.
In making this argument, Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis were embracing a familiar distinction in rights jurisprudence between “prohibitions” and
“regulations.”204 Prohibitions restricted classes of activity, some instances of
which were not harmful, whereas regulations targeted only harmful activities.205
Existing police-powers doctrine generally allowed prohibitions when necessary
to promote the public good.206 But states only had power to regulate vested property rights.207 In Gitlow and Whitney, Holmes and Brandeis insisted that freedom
of speech had a comparable status, and that the government therefore generally
lacked “power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine.”208
203.

In contrast to the majority, Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis asserted that the prosecution
in Gitlow and Whitney needed to show a “clear and present danger,” despite legislatures having
already determined that the category of speech at issue was socially harmful. See Gitlow, 268
U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
204. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107, 108 (1920) (upholding a ban on solicitation as a
“regulation,” not a “prohibition,” because the ban “aims to bring the conduct of the business
into harmony with ethical practice of the legal profession, to which it is necessarily related”).
205. For instance, bans on drinking alcohol can be described as “prohibitions,” whereas bans on
drunk driving can be described as “regulations.” Cf. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
129, 137-38 (1874) (Field, J., concurring) (“[T]he prohibition of sale [of alcohol] in any way,
or for any use, is quite a diﬀerent thing from a regulation of the sale or use so as to protect the
health and morals of the community.”). To be sure, the distinction between “prohibitions”
and “regulations” was hardly self-evident—particularly in those instances where the activity
merely posed a risk of harm or created a harm that would likely only materialize in the aggregate. The majority in Gitlow, for instance, plainly thought that the syndicalism statute “regulated” speech. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 664-70.
206. See, e.g., Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 429 (1902) (“If . . . the State thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling be actually prohibited, the courts
[generally] cannot interfere . . . .”); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (quoting Booth);
see also Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 599 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he scope of
the police power is not limited to regulation as distinguished from prohibition.”).
207. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Carolene Products and Constitutional Structure, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
321, 334-49; see also FREUND, supra note 105, at §§ 58-62 (discussing state power to impose
prohibitions).
208. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney drew from a draft opinion in another case, Ruthenberg v. Michigan, which was
dismissed after the defendant died. In that earlier draft, Brandeis’s emphasis on the statute’s
prohibitory character is especially evident, referring to “[s]tatutes imposing absolute prohibition, as distinguished from regulation.” Louis Brandeis, Draft Opinion in Ruthenberg v.
Michigan, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:14737316$167i [https://perma.cc
/3LXZ-5WFT]. Indeed, Brandeis’s eventual reference to “[p]rohibitory legislation” conveyed
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The problem with the syndicalism laws, then, was not that they singled out
anarchist or communist messages or sought to suppress communicative harms.
The government could still punish the harmful expression of certain ideas. But
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis thought that the First Amendment demanded a case-specific showing that the speech was unprivileged. It was unconstitutional, in their view, to categorically exclude certain ideas from public discourse—that is, to prohibit the dissemination of particular messages—even
though regulations of speech were still allowed.209 Not coincidentally, this understanding of speech rights dovetailed with ordinary due-process analysis, where
judges were responsible for appraising the facts to ensure that the government
was not arbitrarily restricting rights.210
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis had thus articulated a view of expressive
freedom that bears a superficial but misleading resemblance to modern neutrality principles. These Justices sometimes evaluated statutes on their face, focusing
on what the government had done, not merely on the individual’s conduct.211
And in so doing, they treated all ideas as equal in the sense that the government
could not categorically withdraw any idea from public discourse. To prohibit
ideas as such would be to abridge the speech and press rights themselves, not
curtail their abuse. But this embrace of “the traditional American ideal of toleration of opinion,” as the New Republic put it,212 was decidedly not an endorsement
of content or viewpoint neutrality in their modern forms. Quite the contrary. At
the same idea. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Memorandum from
James Landis, Law Clerk, to Louis Brandeis, J. (Aug. 16, 1926), https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu
/manifests/view/drs:14737316$142i [https://perma.cc/NKW3-SA54] (discussing whether
cases “fall within the classification of regulation than that of prohibition”). Notably, Brandeis
did not embrace a categorical bar on prohibitory speech restrictions. Rather, because prohibitions were “so stringent,” he explained, they required heightened justifications, else they become “unduly harsh or oppressive.” Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Thus,
prohibitory laws were “ordinarily” unconstitutional. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374; see also Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (insisting that the dissemination of ideas as such could be suppressed only if their dissemination “so imminently
threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country”).
209. Notably, the majority did not seem to disagree in principle. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 664-65.
Rather, they thought that the statute was best construed as a regulation of harmful speech.
See id. at 664-70.
210. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
211. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that the government had likely
punished the defendants “for the creed that they avow”); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (arguing that communicative harms must be shown in each case, notwithstanding legislation to the contrary); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373-74 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(same). Of course, the “clear and present danger” test also called for as-applied judicial analysis to ensure that the speech had, in fact, posed a clear and present danger of harm.
212. The Call to Toleration, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1919, at 360.
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least with respect to content-based limits on arguably privileged speech,213
Holmes and Brandeis were insisting that speech restrictions had to be linked to
communicative harms, not that the government lacked power to address those
harms.
C. The Functional First Amendment
Although Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis did not prevail in the 1920s,
their ideas gained currency on the Supreme Court by the end of the 1930s.214
Without attempting an exhaustive survey of the cases, this Section highlights
several key developments through the early 1940s. It shows how the Justices reinterpreted earlier doctrines through a more functional lens.
Before jumping into the cases, it is worth briefly considering their genesis as
due-process claims. Today, due-process claims and incorporated-rights claims
are treated as entirely distinct, thus making it easy to defend a neutrality-based
approach to some rights but not to others.215 But this crisp separation had not
emerged by the late 1930s. At that time, due process included a right to challenge

213.

Once again, this discussion does not address wholly incidental speech restrictions since that
issue was not presented in these cases. See supra note 75. The issue became contested later. See
infra Section II.D.
214. Cases throughout the 1930s reflected the gradual shift, and my point here is not to assert clean,
categorical breaks. The functional turn was evident, for instance, in Home Building & Loan
Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934). And, in the First Amendment context, the Court
partly embraced a more functional approach in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
240-42 (1936). Justice Sutherland initially planned to decide the case based on the Equal Protection Clause but later adopted arguments from a draft concurrence written by Justice
Cardozo. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE KINGFISH AND THE CONSTITUTION: HUEY LONG, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 164-66
(1996). The resulting opinion reflected an amalgam of diﬀerent ideas. Sutherland, for instance, adopted a formal rule against special taxes on newspapers but also wrote that the form
of the tax was “itself suspicious” and that such taxes are “seen to be a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
in virtue of the constitutional guaranties.” Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250-51. Indeed, Louisiana had
levied the tax on larger newspapers in an apparent eﬀort to suppress criticisms of the Huey
Long political machine. See CORTNER, supra, at 72-73, 78-79, 83-86.
215. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating in a due
process case that “a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral and
unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation”), with Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct.
2294, 2300 (2019) (stating in a First Amendment case that a statute is unconstitutional when
it “distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with conventional moral
standards and those hostile to them”).
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the substance of the law by showing that a restriction of liberty was unwarranted.216 And so-called “incorporated” rights still operated in largely procedural
ways. Speech and press freedoms, for instance, secured a right against administrative censorship in advance of publication—a specific rule about how the government could restrict speech. And, at least in certain circumstances, these rights
also called for case-specific evaluations of privilege—again, a specific rule about
the processes needed to restrict speech.217 Thus, it made perfect sense for Carolene Products to highlight enumerated-rights cases as a subset of due-process
cases that warranted more searching judicial review.218 Speech and press rights
and due-process rights were still largely on the same doctrinal track.
Recognizing this overlap between the First Amendment and due process underscores the initial absence of neutrality. When regulating other forms of liberty, legislatures could address any type of social harm. And because early speech
cases were due-process cases, it would have been extremely odd to think that the
government somehow lacked power to address communicative harms. Nor was
there any reason to think that it was illegitimate for the government to try to

216.

See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring); see also Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:
Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 991-94 (1999) (discussing how the Court expanded judicial appraisal of the factual predicates of legislation).
217. Early vagueness and overbreadth doctrines were oriented toward maintaining this case-bycase review. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931); Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-97 (1940). In addition, Justice
Holmes and Justice Brandeis had argued that case-by-case review had to be maintained even
in the face of legislative judgments that certain types of speech were harmful. See supra notes
193-213 and accompanying text (discussing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)).
218. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. In the first paragraph, added at Chief Justice Hughes’s
request, Justice Stone called for judicial protection of enumerated rights, and in the second
paragraph, he suggested a heightened need for judicial protection of democratic processes.
See Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights:
Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 282-83 (1995).
It is also worth mentioning the early suggestion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause supplies a limit on state authority to regulate expression. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496, 511-16 (1939) (Roberts, J.).
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shape the way that people think.219 Promoting public morality was plainly a legitimate basis for restricting liberty in due-process cases.220 In sum, neutrality
could only emerge later on, once due-process cases and incorporated-rights cases
moved onto separate doctrinal tracks.
To be sure, the government could not punish the dissemination of ideas as
such. “[T]he legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by
dealing with the abuse,” Chief Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge v. Oregon.221
“The rights themselves must not be curtailed.”222 This principle guaranteed a
certain degree of equality by ensuring that the government could not wholly exclude certain opinions from public debate. The law had to target the abuse of
speech, not merely the dissemination of the ideas themselves. As we have seen,
however, this meant that the government could only target harmful speech, not
that it was unable to target harmful speech.223 To be sure, the Court sometimes
required that harms be “clear and present,” lest the suppression of “abuses” eﬀectively restrict speech and press rights themselves. But that rule was needed precisely because communicative harms were still cognizable. None of the Justices
viewed the First Amendment as a nondiscrimination rule that generally forbade
targeting communicative harms.
To ensure that the government only restricted unprivileged “abuses,” the Justices began to call for a more careful and realistic appraisal of costs and benefits.
“[W]here legislative abridgment of [speech and press] rights is asserted,” Justice
Roberts explained in Schneider v. State, “the courts should be astute to examine

219.

My point here, of course, is not that all forms of content discrimination were valid or that all
viewpoint-based governmental interests were legitimate. For instance, any means of classification—whether speech restrictive or not—had to be designed to promote the public good,
and the government could not target certain ideas as such.
220. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[A]lthough the rights of free
speech and assembly are fundamental . . . [t]heir exercise is subject to restriction, if . . . required in order to protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic
or moral.”); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 602 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting)
(“[The government] may suppress religious practices dangerous to morals, and presumably
those also which are inimical to public safety, health and good order.”). Because morals regulations were widely accepted, debates focused instead on the validity of paternalistic regulations, addressing situations where individuals were mostly harming themselves. See Siegel,
supra note 144, at 8-12.
221. 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
222. Id. at 365.
223.
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See supra Part II.B. It is thus unsurprising that four members of the Gitlow and Whitney majorities joined Chief Justice Hughes’s unanimous opinion in De Jonge.
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the eﬀect of the challenged legislation.”224 Relying on “[m]ere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience,” he continued, was inappropriate with respect to “rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”225 As the Court put it a year later, judges had a responsibility to
“weigh the circumstances” in order to preserve “the power of free and fearless
reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.”226 This was quintessential due-process analysis but with less deference to the government because of the social importance of privileged speech.
Alongside a more realistic evaluation of competing interests, the Justices also
embraced their own agency in defining, and redefining, enumerated constitutional rights. “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights,” Justice Jackson wrote in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, “was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and oﬃcials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts.”227 The judge’s task, he explained, was one of “translating the majestic
generalities of the Bill of Rights . . . into concrete restraints”—a duty, he noted,
that should “disturb self-confidence.”228 Indeed, Jackson continued, “changed
conditions often deprive precedents of reliability and cast us more than we would
choose upon our own judgment.”229 The echoes of Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
and Cardozo could not have been louder.
Another factor that bolstered this increased sense of judicial agency was the
shift away from viewing fundamental common-law rights as a species of general
law. Instead, judges began to treat First Amendment protections for expressive
freedom as distinctively federal in character. Consequently, well-settled issues
suddenly appeared unresolved, and the Speech and Press Clauses began to look
more like empty vessels.230 With incorporated rights now viewed as a species of

224.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); see also, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941) (“We may
appropriately begin our discussion of the judgments below by considering how much, as a
practical matter, they would aﬀect liberty of expression.”).
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940) (quoting Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161).
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). For other sources reflecting this view, see infra note 312 and accompanying text.
Id. at 639.
Id. This lack of guidance, Justice Jackson explained, flowed in large part from changed assumptions about the role of the government and “closer integration of society.” Id. at 639-40.
See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-68 (1941); see, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (“The United States Supreme Court had
no occasion to pass on the constitutionality of legislation making obscenity a crime for more
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federal law, the Justices were positioned to interpret them anew, without being
encumbered by earlier state case law.231
Drawing on the functional turn and the shift away from general law, the
Court began to depart from the traditional scope of existing rules and to focus
instead on the social functions of expressive freedom. This shift was especially
evident in decisions limiting governmental power to require permits for speechrelated activities,232 including solicitation,233 distribution of fliers,234 and parades.235 In these cases, invocations of history were typically brief.236 Nor did the
Justices seem to care that longstanding precedent allowed the government to
regulate speech on public property, like streets and parks.237 Rather, their focus
was on the broader social consequences of expressive freedom.
An overriding concern in these cases was curbing arbitrary administrative
suppression of public discourse. Discretionary licensing was unconstitutional,
the Justices explained, because it could be used as “an instrument of arbitrary
suppression of opinions on public questions.”238 “[T]his Court denies any place
than one hundred and fifty years after the adoption of the First Amendment.”); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as an Amicus Curiae at 5, Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S.
848 (1948) (No. 11), 1948 WL 47136, at *5 (“State power in the field of this case has not been
tested heretofore in this Court because not until 1925 in the Gitlow case . . . was it recognized
that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the States must conform to the same standards of
freedom of expression as, under the First Amendment, are applicable to the Federal Government . . . .”).
231. See Campbell, supra note 121, at 1453-54.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

237.

238.
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Some of these cases also implicated the right of free exercise of religion. See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05 (1940).
See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.
See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griﬃn, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider, 308 U.S. 147; Cantwell, 310
U.S. 296.
See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04; Cox, 312 U.S. at 574; Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160-61. The
Court did invoke history in a highly abstract sense in Lovell, describing the dangers of prior
restraints and stating that “[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of
publication which aﬀords a vehicle of information and opinion.” 303 U.S. at 451-52.
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.). The term “public
fora” emerged later. This decision reflected the broader jurisprudential decline of the public/private divide. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Justices held that the government
had wide latitude to restrict speech on public property. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S.
43, 47 (1897); see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1721-23 (1987) (discussing Hague and Davis). Some cases, however, did recognize limits on licensing schemes that enabled arbitrary
discretion. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719, 723 (Kan. 1888).
Cox, 312 U.S. at 577-78 (summarizing earlier decisions). In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S.
146, 151 (1946), the Court applied this principle to a public subsidy (namely, eligibility for
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to administrative censorship of ideas or capricious approval of distributors,” the
Justices declared.239 By contrast, nondiscretionary permitting schemes were allowed because they did not replicate the dangers of censorship.240 In this limited
sense, a version of neutrality began to emerge as a First Amendment principle,
grounded in a more functional interpretation of the rule against prior restraints.241
While these shifts were underway, the Supreme Court also abandoned a values-laden understanding of intent that, in its practical eﬀect, had limited the
privilege of disseminating certain religious or political views. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court overturned the incitement conviction of Jesse Cantwell—a Jehovah’s Witness adherent—for playing an anti-Catholic record in a predominantly Catholic community.242 According to the Court, Cantwell was simply
trying to proselytize in good faith.243 Of course, longstanding doctrine stipulated
that disseminating religious or political views in good faith could not be made
criminal.244 Notably, however, the Court was now defining good faith in more
individualistic terms, with less emphasis on community norms.245 Even though

lower postal rates), thus embracing the earlier dissenting views of Justice Brandeis and Justice
Holmes. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
407, 417-36 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436-38 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
239. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 595 (1942).
240. See, e.g., Cox, 312 U.S. at 576-77.
241. Informed by the functional turn, judges sometimes argued that laws with discriminatory effects should be closely scrutinized, too. See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
606-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). For discussion of the Jehovah’s Witness cases, see Kessler, supra note 35, at 1941-56.
242. 310 U.S. 296, 300-11 (1940).
243. Id. at 309-10.
244. See supra notes 105-118 and accompanying text.
245. See Post, supra note 94, at 629-32. Cantwell was an important step, but the Court was not yet
embracing neutrality in its modern sense. Cf. id. at 631. The approach in Cantwell was to focus
first on the individual, without looking to the audience, to decide whether speech was privileged. Importantly, antisocial views were protected. Having defined the protected sphere, the
Justices then recognized that interests turning on the antisocial character of the speech—and
the resulting communicative harms—were generally insuﬃcient to warrant suppression. In
eﬀect, this approach resembles modern doctrine. But the relevant constitutional harm was not
discrimination as such. Cf. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020);
Heﬀernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Nor was the Court categorically rejecting governmental interests that turned on communicative eﬀects. Cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). Rather, the Court treated these interests as insuﬃcient to
warrant the suppression of privileged speech. The First Amendment, in other words, did not
remove these sorts of interests from the constitutional ledger. It merely specified that these
interests could not justify the suppression of well-intentioned but antisocial views.
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“the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity,”246 the Justices
denied any “intentional discourtesy.”247
As they curtailed arbitrary administrative suppression and redefined intent
requirements, however, the Justices did not require legislatures to maintain content or viewpoint neutrality. In fact, one doctrinal presumption still pointed in
the opposite direction. When a law restricted public debate “without any reference to language itself,” judges were to scrutinize the restriction carefully.248
When a law specifically targeted certain messages, however, judges had to be
more deferential to the government.249 The rationale was straightforward. Legislative restrictions of “a particular kind of utterance,” Justice Black explained in
Bridges v. California, came “encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation.”250 Although this principle echoed part of the majority’s reasoning in
Gitlow and Whitney, it also accorded with the views of Justice Holmes and Justice
Brandeis, who had argued for less deference to legislatures,251 not negative deference. Laws that targeted particular messages could still be challenged,252 but not
based on any general requirement of neutrality.

246.

247.
248.
249.

250.

251.
252.
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Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 310; see also id. at 308-09 (“It is not claimed that he intended to insult or aﬀront the
hearers by playing the record.”).
See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
670 (1925)).
See, e.g., id. at 257-58; see also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307 (1940) (emphasizing the importance
of legislative judgments). Today, laws that target particular messages are generally considered
viewpoint discriminatory, whereas applications of content-neutral statutes are treated as “content based” if the rationale for applying the statute depends on what the speaker communicated. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2010).
314 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1941); see Robert E. Cushman, Some Constitutional Problems of Civil Liberty, 23 B.U. L. REV. 335, 343 (1943) (“[T]he clear and present danger test is limited to those
cases in which the law does not forbid language as such,” whereas “the bad tendency doctrine . . . is the yardstick by which the Court measures the constitutionality of laws which
punish language thought to be objectionable or dangerous.”); Mark Tushnet, The Hughes
Court and Radical Political Dissent: The Cases of Dirk De Jonge and Angelo Herndon, 28 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 333, 343 (2012) (describing this bifurcated review of targeted and nontargeted restrictions of speech).
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See Herndon, 301 U.S. at 258 (“[T]he penalizing even of utterances of a defined character must
find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government. The
judgment of the legislature is not unfettered.”); Bridges, 314 U.S. at 260-61. By this point, the
Court had begun to backtrack, often sub silentio, from Gitlow and Whitney, which had held
that targeted legislative restrictions of speech eliminated the need for case-specific showings
of harm. But the Justices had not rejected the idea that legislative judgments about the harmfulness of certain speech were entitled to substantial weight. See Robert McCloskey, Free
Speech, Sedition and the Constitution, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 662, 663-64 (1951).

the emergence of neutrality

The idea that statutes targeting certain messages would be less problematic
flips current doctrine on its head,253 but it made perfect sense back then. From a
jurisprudential standpoint, it was still axiomatic that constitutional freedom entailed liberty regulated by law, not arbitrary command. This gave legislators a
key role in setting the boundaries of natural rights, including speech and press
freedoms.254 Legislative judgments were not unassailable, but they still had pride
of place. And from a practical standpoint, existing threats to free expression were
still overwhelmingly administrative. “Probably ninety [percent] of the serious
issues relating to freedom of speech and press arise from the alleged arbitrary
and ruthless enforcement of broadly drawn statutes,” one commentator remarked in 1943.255 Thus, as Laura M. Weinrib observes, reformers “were neither
abandoning a prewar faith in robust popular democracy nor embracing, at least
initially, a radical new vision of constitutional constraint.”256 Initial free-speech
decisions simply did not reflect a libertarian assault on legislative value judgments.257
253.

254.

255.

256.
257.

See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional. . . . When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”) (citations
omitted).
See, e.g., Jones v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1936); id. at 32 (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940); Hague v. Comm. for
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514, 516 (1939) (Roberts, J.); Garfield v. United States ex rel.
Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42-43 (1907); Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890). Of course, statutes themselves had to be nonarbitrary,
and courts were beginning to defer less to legislative judgments in civil-rights cases. See
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938). This development did
not, however, suggest equivalence between legislative and administrative decisions.
Cushman, supra note 250, at 343; see also Schiller, supra note 15, at 3 (“Administrative regulation of speech was pervasive.”). Indeed, proponents of civil liberties had already begun calling
for heightened protection of civil liberties in the administrative realm. See Schiller, supra note
15, at 89 (“By the late 1930s and early 1940s, fears about administrative absolutism had entered the writings of New Dealers and other previous supporters of administrative expertise.”); Laura M. Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 187, 213 (2009) [hereinafter
Weinrib, From Public Interest] (“By the mid-1930s, . . . the early Progressive confidence in regulation had begun to erode.”); Laura Weinrib, Against Intolerance: The Red Scare Roots of Legal
Liberalism, 18 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 7, 18 (2019) (“Increasingly, . . . the toleration
of dissenting ideas emerged as a necessary check on administrative authoritarianism.”).
Weinrib, From Public Interest, supra note 255, at 215.
See id. at 216 (“[L]ike so many of his Progressive colleagues, [Zechariah Chafee] questioned
the authority of the courts to override explicit legislative policy prohibiting speech.”); see also,
e.g., Cushman, supra note 250, at 343 (“[I]n holding these laws valid under the test of bad
tendency the courts are extending to the judgment and discretion of the legislature a judicial
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But concerns about administrative censorship nonetheless facilitated an
eventual constriction of legislative power. This occurred as the Court began to
cross-pollinate among traditional common-law principles, leading to a more
blended and functional account of expressive freedom that stretched across different domains of governmental authority. In particular, rather than treat the
rule against prior restraints and the privilege of speaking on matters of public
concern as distinct doctrines, the Court began to gradually blur them together.
And it did so by drawing on a unified narrative about the benefits of expressive
freedom and the dangers of administrative suppression.
No case better illustrates this functional blending of earlier categories than
Thornhill v. Alabama.258 While participating in a labor strike, Byron Thornhill
had successfully urged a nonunion worker to not cross the picket line. He was
then convicted of violating a state law that banned people from loitering or picketing near a business for the purpose of “hindering, delaying, or interfering with
or injuring any lawful business . . . .”259 Thornhill insisted that his picketing activities were constitutionally privileged.260
Writing his first majority opinion, Justice Murphy recognized that the First
Amendment “embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment.”261 And he described labor disputes as matters of public concern—
a conclusion that fit with the Court’s abandonment of earlier decisions treating

tolerance which, broadly applied, we have come to regard as one of the principal earmarks of
a liberal judge.”).
258. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The Court also blurred categories in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 73738 (1931), which expanded the reach of prior-restraint doctrine but then also embraced exceptions for at least certain categories of speech that was unprivileged, thus blurring previously distinct common-law rules. Near and Thornhill were thus similar, even though Near was
less transparent about its approach.
259. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91.
260. Id. at 92-93.
261. Id. at 101-02.
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contract negotiations as private matters.262 But Thornhill still faced a serious obstacle. In context, his “request” that the nonunion worker not cross the picket
line could easily be viewed as coercive.263
Rather than evaluate the circumstances of Thornhill’s acts, however, Justice
Murphy argued that the law should be “judged upon its face.”264 Ex ante prior
restraints, he noted, were evaluated on their face, too. But “the character of the
evil inherent in a licensing system” was not limited to abuses of power in particular cases.265 Rather, “the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence” stifled
discussion by leaving public debate subject to “harsh and discriminatory enforcement.”266 And so too, Murphy observed, of ex post restrictions when laws
were broad enough to cover privileged speech. The basic problem of an overbroad statute, he explained, was that it eﬀectively delegated to prosecutors a
power “to censure comments on matters of public concern.”267 As a practical matter, then, the “threat of censorship” was just as present.268 Notably, “censorship”
referred to administrative control over expression.269
262.

See id. at 103 (“Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor
disputes appears to us indispensable to the eﬀective and intelligent use of the processes of
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”); see also Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (“The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning,
the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of
free speech, but as part of free assembly.”).
263. See Brief for Respondent at 12-23, Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88 (No. 514), 1940 WL 47039; see, e.g.,
Sarros v. Nouris, 138 A. 607, 610 (Del. Ch. 1927); McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 108
S.E. 226, 229 (Ga. 1921); A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chi. Typographical Union, No. 16, 83 N.E. 940,
944-45 (Ill. 1908). Indeed, a similar argument prevailed in a case the following year. See Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1941). Progressive
lawyers had insisted on a broader definition of coercion during the Lochner era. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470,
470 (1923). And a broad notion of coercion enabled the NLRB to restrict employer speech
during collective bargaining without abridging the freedom of speech. See NLRB v. Va. Elec.
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); Ken I. Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and Speech
Became Conduct: A Political Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 255, 284-95 (2006).
264. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 96. In part, Justice Murphy defended this view using due-process analysis that closely resembled the reasoning in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
265. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97.
266. Id. at 97-98.
267. Id. at 97. Justice Murphy treated “comments on matters of public concern” as “activities that
in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press.” Id.
268. Id. at 98. This may have been a reference to what later came to be known as “chilling eﬀects.”
269. See, e.g., Pentuﬀ v. Park, 138 S.E. 616, 621 (N.C. 1927) (quoting Cowan v. Fairbrother, 24 S.E.
212, 215 (N.C. 1896)) (distinguishing “exemption from censorship” and “security against
[speech-restrictive] laws enacted by the legislative department”). Works that advanced a more

913

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

Justice Murphy had thus taken distinct First Amendment rules, interpreted
them in a functional way, and then creatively merged their analytical structures
based on their shared functions.270 He began with the rule against ex ante prior
restraints, next ascribed certain functions to that rule (i.e., preserving public discussion and preventing discriminatory enforcement), then argued that prosecutorial discretion raised the same concerns ex post, and finally concluded that it
was therefore proper to apply facial analysis to protect the constitutional privilege of “commenting on matters of public concern.” Yet again, the functional approach was paramount.
None of this is to say that the Justices were discarding older categories.
Thornhill drew on a functional account of prior-restraint doctrine but otherwise
left that doctrine in place.271 And the Court also continued to recognize traditional limits on the scope of privileged speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, for
instance, it unanimously held that appending political speech to commercial advertising did not trigger the privilege of speaking on matters of public concern
when done “with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the [advertising
expansive conception of expressive freedom also used the term “censorship” in its traditional
sense. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 112, at 521 (“The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent
such free and general discussion of public matters . . . .”); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN WAR TIMES 8 (1919) (“A death penalty for writing about socialism would be as
eﬀective suppression as a censorship.”). At first, Justice Black and Justice Douglas used the
term “censorship” in its conventional sense. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 494 (1949) (Black, J.); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1953) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). The term was mostly used in reference to administrative restrictions of speech
ex ante, but it could also be used in reference to such restrictions ex post. See, e.g., Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285-86 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). These concerns also
reached judicial restrictions. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 284 (Kan. 1908)
(mentioning “court censorship through injunctions against publication”); see also Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). A limited definition of “censorship” is consistent with the Court’s conclusion in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation that “the subsequent review
of program content is not the sort of censorship at which the [Radio Act of 1927] was directed.” 438 U.S. 726, 737 (1978). For a counterexample, see Note, The Espionage Act, supra
note 182, at 445 (referring to prior governmental censorship, but also “subsequent censorship
by prosecutions for seditious libel as was then practiced in England”).
270. The Court made a similar interpretive move in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
See 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 153 (2006) (“[Cantwell] held the permit statute void as
imposing a prior restraint, but under the religion clauses, not the press clause, thereby extending a doctrine originating in regulation of the press into whole new territory.”). My previous discussion of Cantwell related to the incitement conviction, not this licensing requirement. See supra notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
271. To be clear, prior-restraint doctrine itself was not static. My point here is simply that although
Thornhill relied on a blended functional account of speech and press freedoms, it did not formally abandon the distinction between “prior restraints” and “subsequent punishments.”
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law].”272 And in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, it unanimously held that hurling
epithets at a police oﬃcer was not privileged because “such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”273 The analytical focus of
these cases was still on the nature of the speech at issue—not the neutrality of
the law or of the governmental rationale for restricting speech.
But Chaplinsky deserves further comment. Today, the decision stands as a
narrow exception to the requirement of content neutrality.274 Yet it bears repeating: no such rule existed in the early 1940s. Indeed, as we have seen, existing
doctrine made it harder for claimants to prevail when a legislature had specifically
proscribed particular harmful messages.275 But if neutrality was not at issue, why
did the Court identify “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes” of unprivileged speech?276
The answer lies in the way the Justices were trying to circumvent the perceived errors of Gitlow and Whitney. In Chaplinsky, the defendant argued that his
272.

273.

274.

275.

276.

316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942). The defendant had appended a “protest against oﬃcial conduct” to
commercial advertising and argued that he thus was, as the Court described, “engaged in the
dissemination of matter proper for public information.” Id. That phrasing appears in a variety
of legal sources as a synonym for matters of public concern. See, e.g., ME. CONST. of 1819, art.
I, § 4; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7; cf. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (defending the “[f]reedom to speak
and write about public questions”); Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722,
731 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the right “to express themselves publicly concerning an issue . . . of public importance”).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky had argued that he
had the right to criticize the complaining witness as a public oﬃcial openly acting
in a wrongful manner, and also to criticize the local municipal government by the
use of any language that he desired to employ as long as he did not induce or ask
others to use violence against the local municipal government to overthrow the
same.
Appellant’s Brief at 10, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (No. 255). He also argued that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face. See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (No.
255) (“The statute has been construed so as to prohibit the speaking of the truth concerning
any matter of public concern when it is oﬀensive to others.”).
See, e.g., Lakier, supra note 14, at 2168 (“[T]he Court [in Chaplinsky] found itself in the diﬃcult position of allowing the government to discriminate against speech on the basis of its
content, even though this discrimination was something that the new conception of freedom
of speech otherwise disavowed.”).
See supra notes 248-252 and accompanying text. In Chaplinsky, the judgment was not actually
“legislative” in the sense that it came from a legislature. Rather, it came from a state court’s
construal of the common law. But, after Erie, that view at least counted as the law of New
Hampshire.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
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conviction was invalid because state law banned certain messages without requiring a case-specific showing of harm.277 This argument challenged the reasoning in Gitlow and Whitney, which had held that the facial validity of a speechtargeting statute eﬀectively barred as-applied claims. And by 1942, a majority of
the Justices thought that Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis had made the better argument.278 But the Court was not ready to entirely abandon the logic of
Gitlow and Whitney.
Instead, the Court held that the New Hampshire law did not restrict any constitutionally privileged speech. “The statute, as construed,” Justice Murphy observed, “does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause
a breach of the peace.”279 But rather than defer to a legislative judgment about
the inherent harmfulness of certain messages, Murphy instead relied on tradition. “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,” he
explained, “the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.”280 The doctrinal significance of Chaplinsky,
then, was its holding that only historically recognized categories of unprivileged
speech could be entirely banned without any case-specific showing of harm. Gitlow and Whitney were thus circumscribed. But the Court’s reasoning—and the
legal backdrop of its decision—had nothing to do with the modern idea of content neutrality.
Nor did neutrality undergird the famous decision the following year in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.281 To be sure, Justice Jackson’s majority opinion includes a host of enduring phrases that are often construed as

277.

New Hampshire’s breach-of-the-peace rule was facially invalid, he argued, because it extended to oﬀensive behavior that was privileged, including “honest criticism of government,
religion, politics, social functions, or any other subject.” Appellant’s Brief, supra note 273, at
14; see also id. at 18 (“[State law] permits conviction for the exercise of the right of free speech
even where there is no clear and present danger of violence or threatened violence or breach
of the peace.”). Chaplinsky also claimed that the application of the law was constitutionally
invalid because his virulent denouncement of the job performance of a police oﬃcer was privileged as a truthful criticism on matters of public concern. See, e.g., id. at 10; Appellant’s Reply
Brief, supra note 273, at 3.
278. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1941); see also Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 507 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow
has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale.”).
279. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
280. Id. at 571-72.
281. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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paeans to neutrality.282 Eﬀorts “to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of
some end thought essential” were futile and dangerous, Jackson insisted, and
“[c]ompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”283 Instead, he explained, minority opinions must be tolerated, at least
where “harmless to others [and] to the State.”284 Then, in one of his most memorable lines, Jackson declared: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no oﬃcial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox . . . .”285
Barnette was protective of minority views, reflecting increasing concerns
about arbitrary discrimination at home and terrifying examples of totalitarianism abroad.286 But Justice Jackson was not embracing content or viewpoint neutrality. His constitutional vision was one of toleration and pluralism—disallowing oﬃcial orthodoxy but not requiring neutrality.287 Indeed, Jackson was deeply
hostile to placing artificial limits on the legislature’s ability to balance social and
individual interests.288 And Barnette did not suggest otherwise. Jackson rejected

282.

283.
284.
285.
286.

287.

288.

See sources cited supra note 16. For a criticism of Barnette along these lines, see Steven D.
Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (2003), though Smith does
acknowledge that Barnette “is susceptible to . . . more benign interpretations,” id. at 627. For a
subsequent treatment that is more critical of a “neutrality” reading, see Steven D. Smith,
“Fixed Star” or Twin Star?: The Ambiguity of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 801, 824-25 (2019), arguing that “[t]he better interpretation of Barnette is that it prohibits governments from compelling citizens to aﬃrm things they do not believe.” See also Paul Horwitz, A Close Reading of
Barnette, in Honor of Vincent Blasi, 13 FIU L. REV. 689, 725 (2019) (agreeing with Smith’s
conclusion).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-41.
Id. at 642.
Id.
See L.A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 371, 379 (1974) (describing concerns about arbitrary discrimination against Jehovah’s
Witnesses); Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1996) (describing the influence of concerns about
totalitarianism on constitutional jurisprudence).
In spatial terms, orthodoxy would demand being in a particular place, pluralism would allow
freedom of movement within socially defined boundaries, and neutrality would allow individuals to set their own boundaries.
See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 595 (1942) (“The ordinary requirements of civilized
life compel [an] adjustment of interests. The task of reconcilement is made harder by the
tendency to accept as dominant any contention supported by a claim of interference with the
practice of religion or the spread of ideas.”). Barnette also acknowledged the legitimacy of the
government’s desire to foster “[n]ational unity as an end.” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.

917

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

compelled “orthodox[y],” “coerce[d] uniformity,” and “[c]ompulsory unification” with respect to particular messages.289 The state, he insisted, had to be tolerant of dissenting ideas and could not force individuals to aﬃrm views that they
did not believe. But toleration of this sort—a ban on oﬃcial orthodoxy—is not
equivalent to neutrality.290
D. The Preferred-Freedoms Conflict
As we have seen, the Court in the early 1940s generally treated the constitutional privilege of speaking on matters of public concern as a “preferred” freedom but not one that was “absolute.” Criminal intent negated it.291 And it was
defeasible, as stated in Thornhill, where a “clear danger of substantive evils
[arose] under circumstances aﬀording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas
by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.”292 Alongside this
substantive privilege, the Court also rejected prior restraints and disfavored
other modes of restricting speech that gave administrators or judges too much
discretion.293
But while all the Justices favored broader security for expression, this Section
describes how they increasingly parted ways over the scope and strength of these
standards. One group, led by Justice Black and Justice Douglas, favored more
robust protections for speakers, while another group, led by Justice Frankfurter
and Justice Jackson, took a far more limited view of expressive freedom.294 As we
will see, ideas of neutrality became increasingly prominent during the 1940s,

289.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-42.
290. At a high enough level of generality, of course, any content-based limit on speech could be
described as establishing expressive orthodoxy, just as bans on foie gras and haggis could be
described as establishing gastronomical orthodoxy. But this wordplay does not capture Justice
Jackson’s thinking. He was not equating anti-orthodoxy with neutrality. The problem at hand
was coerced aﬃrmation of a particular ideology—that is, an eﬀort to establish orthodoxy—
not suppression of harmful speech.
291. See Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589 (1943) (concluding that a restriction of speech was
unconstitutional in part because the speaker did not have “an evil or sinister purpose”); see
also Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 690 (1944) (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that
subversive speech was not privileged because of criminal intent).
292. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940). Rather than referring to the privilege as “defeasible,” one might say that speech creating a clear and present danger was beyond the scope
of the privilege. However, in my view, the language of defeasibility better captures how the
Justices conceptualized the privilege.
293. See supra notes 232-235, 238-241.
294. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Death and Rebirth of the Clear and Present Danger Test, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ
211, 215 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009).
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though not in ways that directly map onto current doctrine. Perhaps the most
important development of this period, however, was the way that First Amendment law increasingly departed from earlier traditions.
For the Black-Douglas camp, neutrality made no constitutional diﬀerence.
Their focus was on ensuring that privileged freedoms were secured against all
legal threats. In Murdock v. City of Jeannette, for instance, the Court held that a
Jehovah’s Witness adherent could not be forced to pay a nondiscriminatory licensing fee in order to sell religious literature.295 Writing for the majority, Justice
Douglas insisted that the neutrality of the law was “immaterial.”296 What mattered was the encroachment on constitutionally “preferred” freedoms.297 For the
rest of the decade, a slim majority took this position time and again. Laws that
did not target speech, like trespassing laws, nonetheless triggered careful judicial
review when applied to constitutionally privileged acts.298
By contrast, the group led by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson generally treated neutral laws as raising no constitutional concerns unless they vested
too much discretion in executive or judicial oﬃcers.299 But this position still did

295.

319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
296. Id. at 115. Indeed, the fact that the license tax was “flat” rather than “apportioned” made it
more constitutionally suspect. See id. at 113-14. But see Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (treating an “apportioned” parade fee as more constitutionally suspect
because “[t]he fee assessed will depend on the administrator’s measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its content”). Justice Douglas wrote that “a
community may not suppress, or the state tax, the dissemination of views because they are
unpopular, annoying or distasteful.” Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116. This passage seems to mean
that those harms were insuﬃcient to counterbalance the right—not that the right itself was
defined in reference to the neutrality of the means or ends of the law.
297. See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). In Murdock, the
privileged conduct was a “religious rite.” 319 U.S. at 109-10. For a discussion of Justice Douglas’s struggle to put boundaries on the range of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause,
see Kessler, supra note 35, at 1971-74.
298. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106,
139-40, 144 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Marsh is usually remembered as being about
state action, but the crucial fact for Justice Black was the restriction of privileged conduct.
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509-10.
299. See, e.g., Murdock, 319 U.S. at 118 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Marsh, 326 U.S. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment). This approach had initially enjoyed widespread support on the Court. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939); Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 30304 (1940); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a “narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution” (emphasis added)).
Notably, this approach to neutrality was not formalistic. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 134-35
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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not reflect neutrality in its modern form. In particular, it did not disallow the
government from suppressing communicative harms or posit that non-neutral
laws were presumptively unconstitutional. Rather, for Frankfurter and Jackson,
neutrality was a way of limiting the coverage of the First Amendment.300 On this
view, only targeted restrictions of speech called for careful judicial analysis to
ensure that the restriction did not target disfavored views merely because of hostility to the views themselves. Following Justices Holmes and Brandeis, Frankfurter and Jackson thought that government could not prohibit the expression of
harmful ideas; it could only regulate their dissemination by restricting the harmful expression of those ideas. And judicial review was needed to ensure that the
former did not come under the guise of the latter.301
But while they generally voted together, Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson likely had diﬀerent jurisprudential reasons for using neutrality as a screening
device. For Frankfurter, the preeminent concern was how to cabin judicial review, not how to interpret the First Amendment.302 Restrictions of political discourse, Frankfurter observed, “come to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.”303 But this approach was grounded more on a bifurcated
theory of judicial review than an interpretation of the First Amendment. Speech,
he thought, was generally regulable in promotion of the public good. Indeed,
Frankfurter vehemently denied that enumerated liberties enjoyed a “preferred
position.”304
300.

301.

302.
303.

304.
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For the standard work on “coverage” and “protection,” see Frederick Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981). Once again, this Article
takes no position on whether governmental targeting of communicative harms was a threshold aspect of First Amendment coverage in earlier eras. See supra notes 75, 213.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); Murdock v.
City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 105, 139 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 334 and 344 and
accompanying text (documenting more examples).
See, e.g., Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594-95.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Am. Fed’n of
Lab. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941) (describing the constitutional limits on a state’s
attempt to ban picketing).
See, e.g., Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 90-96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Ted White argues that Justice
Frankfurter embraced bifurcated review in the early 1940s and then became disillusioned with
that project later that decade. See White, supra note 14, at 338-40. Respectfully, I think White
is mistaken. To see why, we must disentangle three issues. First, Frankfurter thought that
speech was a preferred freedom in the sense that certain encroachments upon speech called
for more searching judicial review than was ordinarily warranted in due-process cases. Second, he thought that speech was not a preferred freedom in the sense that incidental restrictions
triggered heightened review. Third, he thought that speech was not a preferred freedom in the
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Justice Jackson, by contrast, took a more capacious view of the judicial role
and a somewhat more interpretive view of rights. Judges, he explained in Barnette, had “the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights . . . into concrete restraints on oﬃcials dealing with the problems of the
twentieth century . . . .”305 Unlike Justice Black and Justice Douglas, however,
Jackson tended to view rights in terms of limits on governmental power—not as
shields around certain types of behavior.306 Thus, while Jackson rejected state
authority to force objecting students to salute the flag,307 he also insisted that
applying nondiscriminatory taxes to religious and expressive activities raised no
First Amendment concerns.308 In other words, Jackson’s approach was largely
framed by an inclination to treat rights as limitations on powers.
Put in highly stylized terms, one could say that Justice Frankfurter’s approach was grounded on the remnants of the natural-rights tradition, whereas
Justice Jackson’s approach was grounded on the legacy of common-law rights.
For Frankfurter, the common good was paramount, whereas for Jackson, rights
could operate as specific limits on governmental powers. But the functional turn
sense that speech rights operated as individualistic claims against the public good. Frankfurter
consistently held all three views throughout the 1940s. On the first principle, he and his colleagues had no disagreement. And on the second and third principles, he quickly noted his
disagreements. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (second principle); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (third principle). My reading of Frankfurter’s stated hostility to the “preferred freedoms” paradigm in the
late 1940s is that he was responding to the successful use of that label by Justice Black and
Justice Douglas in promoting the second and third principles—not that he changed his mind
about the first principle.
305. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); see also id. (“Much of the
vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard.”). See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 22 (1941) (“The Supreme Court is also the voice of the Constitution in vindicating the
rights of the individual under the federal Constitution against both the national and state
governments.”).
306. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635-36; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). This
feature of Justice Jackson’s jurisprudence is recognized in Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 28081 (2000). But contra Bybee, supra, at 289, Jackson did not think that the First Amendment
wholly barred Congress from restricting speech. When Jackson wrote that the First Amendment “exclude[d]” Congress from restricting speech, he was referring to what “some would”
infer, not what he inferred. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 28 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
307. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-42.
308. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579-83 (1944) (Roberts, Frankfurter &
Jackson, JJ., dissenting). For another illustration of Justice Jackson’s use of content neutrality
to limit the coverage of the First Amendment, see Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“No . . . infringement of free speech arises unless such regulation or prohibition undertakes to censor the contents of the broadcasting.”).
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in rights jurisprudence blurred distinctions between these two frameworks. An
approach to judicial review that allowed judges to second-guess legislative assessments was not all that diﬀerent from an approach to traditional commonlaw rights that allowed judges to reshape those rules based on their social functions. And with respect to expressive freedom, the conceptual overlap between a
democracy-reinforcing account of judicial review and a democracy-reinforcing
account of speech rights made this convergence especially striking.309
Other Justices, meanwhile, sought to define privileged spheres of individual
liberty. In doing so, they abandoned the idea that laws targeting certain messages
should receive greater deference than neutral laws. “[I]t is the character of the
right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs,” Justice
Rutledge explained in Thomas v. Collins.310 Consequently, the “clear and present
danger” test applied to any restriction of preferred freedoms.311 Legislatures still
had to decide how to balance “the concrete clash of particular interests,” Rutledge
observed. “But in our system,” he insisted, “where the line can constitutionally
be placed presents a question this Court cannot escape answering independently,
whatever the legislative judgment, in the light of our constitutional tradition.”312
This was not an embrace of neutrality, but at least the Court had eschewed what
had been in some sense an anti-neutrality aspect of First Amendment law.
At the same time, the earlier boundaries of privileged speech became less
pronounced. The category of speech on matters of public concern, for instance,
lost its formalist edges, now encompassing previously unprivileged matters.313
This shift was most notable with respect to speech concerning labor relations,

309.

310.

311.

312.

313.
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See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 305, at 284 (discussing the Court’s “stamping out attempts by
local authorities to suppress the free dissemination of ideas, upon which the system of responsible democratic government rests”).
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). Justice Frankfurter later claimed that Justice Rutledge’s opinion was
not an opinion of the Court because Justice Jackson had concurred “only to say that he agreed
that the case fell into ‘the category of a public speech, rather than that of practicing a vocation
as solicitor.’” Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at
548). Some scholars, however, dispute that “Jackson was concurring only in result.” Linzer,
supra note 218, at 299.
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530. It should be noted, however, that the applicability of the “clear and
present” danger standard was disputed even after Thomas. For a discussion of this issue, see
Chester James Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability, 48 MICH.
L. REV. 811 (1950). For an argument against using the clear and present danger test to evaluate
incidental restrictions of speech, see Wallace Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger—from
Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952).
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 531-32; see also, e.g., Pennekemp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (“The
Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to determine the [First Amendment’s] meaning and application.”).
See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1941).
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which was of central concern to the New Deal Justices. “Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes,” the Court declared, was “indispensable to the eﬀective and intelligent use of the processes of
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”314
Whether speech was well-intentioned or addressed a matter of public concern
also became far less pressing once the Court became more receptive to facial
claims of vagueness and overbreadth.315 And that shift, too, reflected the functional turn. Case-by-case assessments, Justice Rutledge warned in Thomas v.
Collins, would underprotect privileged speech, eﬀectively “compel[ling] the
speaker to hedge and trim.”316 Concerns about “chilling eﬀects” thus called for
extending judicial protection for expression beyond the scope of the traditional
privilege.
With these changes, a crucial inflection in speech doctrine was beginning to
take shape. In some sense, the common-law strand of speech and press rights
was fading as the Justices moved away from traditional rules. Yet the majority
was also beginning to signal that speech and press rights were more than just
preferred freedoms that called for heightened due-process review.317 Though not
yet fully conceptualized, a more substantive and legalistic notion of speech and
press freedoms seemed to be coming into view.
iii. the emergence of neutrality
The functional turn had given rise to new problems and new responses. The
rights-enforcement project was no longer one of generally supervising the police
powers, coupled with the enforcement of traditional common-law rules. Nor did
the Court approach its task with the same interpretive assumptions. Both the
landscape and the lens had changed.

314.

Thomas, 323 U.S. at 532 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940)). This
reasoning echoed the progressive critique of Lochner-era decisions that drew formalist distinctions between economic and political matters. See Luke Norris, Constitutional Economics, 28
YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 1, 4-6, 11-34 (2015). Notably, the approach championed by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson was even less interested in the older distinction between “public”
and “economic” realms. Their “Lochnerism” complaints thus aimed at an increasingly formalist approach to First Amendment rights and the decision to treat speech rights as “preferred
freedoms.”
315. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 531; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948).
316. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 535.
317. By contrast, early vagueness and overbreadth doctrines were oriented largely toward maintaining this case-by-case review, ensuring judicial evaluation of whether verdicts were
grounded on privileged conduct. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940).
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My goal in this Part is to trace the emergence of content and viewpoint neutrality in a way that is comprehensible but that does not convey a false sense of
linear progression. One aspect of this story, however, was constant: doctrine became increasingly unmoored from earlier traditions. What had begun as a functional reinterpretation of inherited legal rules gradually morphed into a freestanding functional account that operated mostly on its own, independent of
those rules.
A. Increasing Absolutism
Although they disagreed about many things, all the Justices in the early
1940s embraced two principles. First, the government could restrict speech in
cases of genuine public need. Second, the government could not restrict speech
for its own sake or ban the dissemination of particular ideas. Disagreements lingered, to be sure, about when to require a showing of “clear and present danger”
and how restrictive that test should be. But to some degree, all of the Justices
embraced a “balancing” approach—weighing speaker interests against countervailing governmental interests.318 And none insisted that limits on speech had to
be independent of social norms. The paradigm was still primarily one of toleration, not neutrality.319
During the 1940s, however, the majority of the Justices took an increasingly
absolutist approach to speech rights. This Section will briefly trace some of these
developments. At the outset, though, it is worth stating the punchline: the suggestions of viewpoint neutrality that emerged by the end of the decade were
mostly a byproduct of growing absolutism. Although doctrine was becoming
more protective of speakers, neutrality was still not the organizing principle of
expressive freedom. The majority of the Justices still viewed speech and press
rights as shields around particular preferred freedoms, not as prohibitions on
content-based classifications or viewpoint-based interests.

318.

See Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and
the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71,
87-88; Powe, supra note 286, at 379.
319. One should not put much weight on labels, but it is worth noting that the Justices sometimes
used the term “toleration.” See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (referring
to the “widest possible toleration of conflicting views”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (Black, J., concurring) (referring to the “widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints”).
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The backdrop of these developments was a virulent dispute about rights jurisprudence more broadly.320 Across several constitutional domains, a coalition
led by Justice Black and Justice Douglas emphasized the primacy of the federal
judiciary in securing fundamental rights, particularly against state violations.321
In doing so, these Justices took an expansive and legalistic view of enumerated
rights and sought to cabin judicial discretion.322 And instead of relying on common-law traditions, they often rested their decisions on claims about text and
original meaning.323 Meanwhile, the group led by Justice Frankfurter and Justice
Jackson resisted this doctrinaire and centralizing approach. Defining rights more
as interests than as absolutes, they insisted that states had a crucial role to play
in defining the boundaries of civil liberty.324
This broader conflict over rights framed debates about speech and press freedoms. The more absolutist approach was especially evident in a narrow definition of “clear and present danger.” Social harms had to be “immediate” and
needed to “clearly and not dubiously outweigh” speech interests, Justice
Rutledge insisted in 1948.325 At least in tone, this was hardly what Justice Murphy—also a member of the Black-Douglas camp—had described eight years earlier as a judicial obligation to “weigh the circumstances.”326 Even legislative judgments, Justice Rutledge now insisted, had to be free of doubt.327 With this test,

320.

321.

322.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

These legal disputes were paralleled by rancorous personal conflict. See Urofsky, supra note
318, at 71, 87-88; Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 20304.
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
82-84, 90-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1949)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 717
(1963); Sylvia Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 197-98. Legalistic
rules also facilitated the goal of providing nationwide protection for expressive freedom. Prior
to its procedural innovations of the 1950s and 60s, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(holding that federal habeas courts may review federal constitutional claims denied by state
courts); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a civil
cause of action against public oﬃcials who violate individual constitutional rights), the Court
could hardly review thousands upon thousands of claims each year on direct review. For a
discussion of how “rationing” concerns are pervasive in modern jurisprudence, see ANDREW
COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 4 (2019).
See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-16.
See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-29.
United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939)).
See Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. at 145 (demanding “indubitable public advantage”).

925

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

one commentator observed, the Justices had begun “to imply that incitement to
crime is the only abuse of free expression.”328
The increasing absolutism of speech rights was especially on display in Terminiello v. Chicago.329 Arthur Terminiello had been convicted of breaching the
peace by delivering a racist tirade. When the case reached the Supreme Court,
five Justices voted to reverse. The decision ultimately rested on a technical flaw
in the jury instructions.330 But Justice Douglas’s majority opinion featured
sweeping constitutional protection for speakers, even in riotous circumstances.
“The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs,” he
wrote, is “one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”331 This freedom often came with “profound unsettling eﬀects,” but it still
warranted protection absent “a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”332 To hold otherwise, he claimed, would
be to permit the government to impose a “standardization of ideas.”333
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson warned that their colleagues were pulling First Amendment doctrine back into the snares of Lochnerera jurisprudence. Suppressing ideas for its own sake was disallowed, they recognized,334 but legislatures still had room to decide which means were necessary
to advance social ends. “If ‘the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,’” Frankfurter wrote in Winters v. New York, “neither
does it enact the psychological dogmas of the Spencerian era.”335 Legislators, he

328.

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

335.
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Mendelson, supra note 311, at 322. Noting this consequence, some commentators argued that
the clear and present danger test should be limited or redefined in certain contexts. See 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 59 (1947) (proposing that the clear and present danger
test be reformulated in the context of obscenity regulations). See generally Leslie Kendrick, On
“Clear and Present Danger,” 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1661 (2019) (“The diﬃculty was,
and is, that speech can pose many risks other than in-the-moment positive or negative reactions that could lead to harmful results.”).
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Powe, supra note 286, at 386.
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It does not appear that the motive in punishing him is to
silence the ideology he expressed as oﬀensive to the State’s policy or as untrue, or has any
purpose of controlling his thought or its peaceful communication to others. There is no claim
that the proceedings against Terminiello are designed to discriminate against him or the faction he represents or the ideas that he bespeaks.”); see also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The State cannot of course forbid public proselyting or religious argument merely because public oﬃcials disapprove the speaker’s views.”).
333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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insisted, were far more competent than judges to identify causal links between
expression and harmful conduct.336 Jackson echoed these sentiments in Terminiello. “An old proverb warns us to take heed lest we ‘walk into a well from looking
at the stars,’” he cautioned.337 The need for public order, Jackson lamented, was
being replaced with “a dogma of absolute freedom for irresponsible and provocative utterance.”338
Even with the Court embracing a more absolutist approach, however, the
governing paradigm was still toleration, not neutrality. To be sure, the majority
seemed in eﬀect to be disabling the government from targeting communicative
harms.339 But Justice Douglas had arrived at that position using an increasingly
narrow view of “clear and present danger”—not by articulating anything especially problematic about content-based or viewpoint-based restrictions.340 The
core idea was that the dissemination of certain ideas could not be eﬀectively prohibited, no matter how abhorrent. In this sense, the Court was suggesting an
“equality of status in the field of ideas,” as Alexander Meiklejohn famously put
it.341 But statements of this sort need to be read in context. They underpinned a
right of nearly absolute toleration, not a right to neutral treatment.342

336.

337.
338.

339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. Justice Frankfurter was not saying that the Court had done this as a doctrinal matter but
rather that it was doing so “[w]ithout formally professing to do so,” through excessive tightening of vagueness doctrine. Id.
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 28; see also, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(noting “how easy it is to fall into the ways of mechanical jurisprudence through the use of
oversimplified formulas . . . [and] bloodless categories”); Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S.
460, 466 (1950) (“The constitutional boundary line between the competing interests of society involved in the use of picketing cannot be established by general phrases.”).
See Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1465, 1493 (2016).
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 27 (Greenwood Press 1979) (1948).
For further discussion, see supra note 245. The Court’s unanimous decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1949), underscores this point. The case obviously
involved suppression of communicative harms, making the decision now seem aberrational.
See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1347 (2005).
In 1949, however, none of the Justices conceptualized the First Amendment as generally disabling the government from targeting communicative harms.
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B. The Return of Balancing
With the appointment of two new Justices, the Court quickly shifted gears.
This Section traces the doctrinal developments in the 1950s, including the embrace of a “balancing” approach to expressive freedom—weighing speaker interests against countervailing governmental interests—and the attendant problems
and critiques that flowed from that approach. As we will see, a limited notion of
content neutrality became more prominent during this period. And by the end
of the decade, Justice Black and Justice Douglas were beginning to articulate notions of neutrality in something much closer to their modern form.
The retreat from nearly absolute toleration was apparent right away with the
decision in American Communications Association v. Douds, which embraced the
limited notion of content neutrality that Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson
had been championing for a decade.343 On this view, judges had a special responsibility to evaluate laws that were “either frankly aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas” or, “although ostensibly aimed at the regulation of conduct,
may [have] actually ‘be[en] made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free
expression of views.’”344 But if eﬀects on expression were merely incidental, a
“rational connection between the prohibitions of the statute and its objects”
would suﬃce.345 In modern terms, content-neutral restrictions only triggered
rational-basis review, whereas content-based restrictions triggered a more careful judicial balancing test—a “candid and informed weighing of the competing
interests,” as Frankfurter put it the following year.346 Douds thus abandoned the
“preferred freedoms” approach. Speech was to be generally regulable to promote
the public good, and the judicial task was simply to ensure that targeted restrictions were not arbitrary.
The Court’s embrace of neutrality as a screening device in no way disallowed
the government from responding to communicative harms or pursuing viewpoint-based interests. Some expression, Chief Justice Vinson noted in Douds,

343.

339 U.S. 382 (1950).
Id. at 402-03 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (Roberts,
J.).
345. Id. at 405. This shift then required strained reinterpretations of earlier cases, including Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1951). Justice
Black and Justice Douglas vigorously dissented not only on the substance but also on the
Court’s failure to overturn some of these earlier cases. Id. at 649-50 (Black, J., dissenting).
346. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Siegel, supra
note 294, at 218 (“From Frankfurter’s Dennis concurrence, deferential balancing flowered into
the general mode of analysis for First Amendment issues.”); see, e.g., Communist Party of U.S.
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1961) (employing a deferential balancing test).
344.
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could be suppressed if “oﬀensive to the moral standards of the community.”347
Moreover, he explained, the government had every right to make a genuine, realistic appraisal of the dangers that certain views posed to society. “[B]eliefs are
springs to action,” Vinson urged, and to argue that government has no power
whatsoever to address these harms “is to make a fetish of beliefs.”348 The slippery
slope to unlimited governmental thought control, he added, was not a threat
“while this Court sits” because judges could address “the problem of balancing
the conflicting individual and national interests.”349 Vinson was starkly rebutting
the absolutist approach that Justice Douglas had suggested only a year earlier in
Terminiello.
Subsequent decisions reinforced this limited view of expressive freedom.
The plurality in Dennis v. United States insisted that, “subject to [judicial] review,”
the government could determine “that certain kinds of speech are so undesirable
as to warrant criminal sanction.”350 The Court followed that suggestion in Beauharnais v. Illinois by upholding the conviction of someone who had published a
racist screed. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter explained that Illinois
could reasonably conclude that “wilful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial
and religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community.”351 The new majority also quickly backtracked in Feiner v. New York from

347.

348.

349.
350.
351.

Douds, 339 U.S. at 398. In support of this proposition, Chief Justice Vinson cited cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. at 409-10; see also id. at 435 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In
weighing claims that any particular activity is above the reach of law, we have a high responsibility to do so in the light of present-day actualities, not nostalgic idealizations valid for a
simpler age.”).
Douds, 339 U.S. at 410.
341 U.S. at 508 (plurality opinion).
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 259 (1952). Drawing on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942), the Court held that a statute targeting “group libel” was facially valid even
without requiring the jury to identify a “clear and present danger” of harm. Beauharnais, 343
U.S. at 257, 261, 266.
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the more capacious understanding of expressive freedom articulated in Terminiello.352 Justice Black and Justice Douglas continued to insist that speech on matters of public concern warranted rigorous constitutional protection, but they
were now in the minority.353
The balancing approach that prevailed in the 1950s carried the usual benefits
of flexible standards.354 It was context sensitive and did not artificially elevate
some social interests over others using “oversimplified formulas” or “nostalgic
idealizations valid for a simpler age.”355 “The task of this Court to maintain a
balance between liberty and authority is never done,” Justice Jackson wrote, “because new conditions today upset the equilibriums of yesterday.”356 But as is so
often true, the benefits of balancing also turned out to be liabilities. And that was
particularly evident as an intellectual tide began to swell in favor of so-called
“neutral principles.”
The basic premise of this view, as Herbert Wechsler famously stated, was
that judges should use “criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of
reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will.”357 Like others who shared
his perspective, Wechsler fervently denied that judges should merely discover
and apply earlier legal traditions without considering their underlying social
functions.358 Judges, he thought, thus needed to make some “value choices”

352.

353.

354.
355.

356.
357.

See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1951) (“Petitioner was . . . neither arrested nor
convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it was the reaction which it
actually engendered.”).
See, e.g., Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting); Wieman v. Updegraﬀ, 344 U.S.
183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 303 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 340, 344 (1957) (Black, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). By 1959, however, Justice Douglas claimed that speech and
press freedoms were “not in terms or by implication confined to discourse of a particular kind
and nature.” Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
27 (1992) (discussing perceived tradeoﬀs in the use of rules and standards).
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“oversimplified formulas”); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 435 (1950) (“nostalgic idealizations”);
see also, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(calling for “candid and informed weighing of the competing interests” rather than “announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved”). See generally Laurent
B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1434-35 (1962) (discussing
this “balancing” approach).
Douds, 339 U.S. at 445 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11
(1959). For general discussion of the legal-process school, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99 (1995).
358. Wechsler, supra note 357, at 18-19.
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when constructing legal doctrine.359 But he urged that judges not rely on their
own moral notions to decide cases. Their decisions had to be grounded on reasoned decision-making, using articulable principles that could be applied across
like cases.360
On its own terms, Wechsler was hardly suggesting that the Justices needed
to embrace content or viewpoint neutrality.361 Although critics often distorted
his point,362 Wechsler was not arguing that the principles themselves had to be
“neutral” in the sense of being wholly independent of judicial assessments of
value.363 Rather, he was advocating for principled and consistent decision-making.
Any number of diﬀerent approaches to expressive freedom could be “neutral”
under Wechsler’s definition.364
But at least in some cases, the idea of “neutral principles” posed serious problems for First Amendment doctrine. The Court’s “balancing” approach called for
a realistic appraisal of all the contending interests, without artificially elevating
some and discarding others. But how could moral interests be weighed in the
constitutional balance? Was it even possible for judges to evaluate the weight of
moral interests?

359.

Id. at 19; see DUXBURY, supra note 357, at 264 (“Process jurisprudence is not entirely antithetical
to judicial activism.” (citation omitted)).
360. See Wechsler, supra note 357, at 15 (supporting “reaching judgment on analysis and reasons
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved”). “[N]eutral principles,” as one
scholar nicely rephrases, are “principles [that] are general and capable of neutral application.”
DUXBURY, supra note 357, at 269.
361. Wechsler did criticize the Court’s obscenity cases, but his immediate point was that the Justices needed to articulate the reasons for their per curiam orders. See Wechsler, supra note 357,
at 20-21.
362. Critics unfairly criticized Wechsler for (purportedly) asserting that the selection of principles
could be free of value judgments. See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 664-65 (1960). That critique
would have applied to Robert Bork but not Wechsler. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1971) (calling for neutrality in “the definition and the derivation of principles”).
363. Much of the controversy that followed Wechsler’s article focused on his critique of per curiam
desegregation decisions, with many commentators insisting that those decisions were, in fact,
principled. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1959).
364. Wechsler’s notion of neutrality, for instance, would be consistent with reorienting First
Amendment doctrine around judicially crafted categories of “protected” and “unprotected”
speech, so long as placing cases into those categories did not call for case-specific judicial value
judgments. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2010) (describing the government’s proposal for a similar approach).
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A typical judicial response to values-based indeterminacy problems of this
sort was to rely on external criteria instead of “merely personal and private notions.”365 Judges could never fully escape from their own biases, of course. But
as best possible, Justice Frankfurter explained, judges faced with legal indeterminacy should strive to make a “detached consideration of conflicting claims”
rather than an “ad hoc and episodic” judgment.366
When considering morals, however, dispassionate balancing increasingly
seemed chimerical. For one thing, judges simply lacked the capacity to evaluate
the link between morals regulations and social harms.367 And even if one supposed that certain forms of “immoral” speech produced social harms, how
should judges define the relevant boundaries? The problem is illustrated by the
statement of a New York judge who relied on these boundaries:
Our Federal and State Constitutions assume that the moral code, which
is part of God’s order in this world, exists as the substance of society. The
people of this State have acted through their Legislature, on that assumption. We have not so cast ourselves adrift from that code, nor are we so
far gone in cynicism, that the word “immoral” has no meaning for us.368
By the 1950s, however, it was evident to members of the Supreme Court that
moral judgments could not be reduced to legal criteria.369 As Justice Black put it,
“judges possess no special expertise providing exceptional competency to set
standards and to supervise the private morals of the Nation.”370
The Court’s initial solution with respect to “obscene” speech was to define
obscenity in a more objective way and then treat that category as being entirely

365.

366.
367.

368.
369.
370.
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Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
Id. at 172.
See Kalven, supra note 230, at 4-5; cf. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 911 (1963) (“In all but the simplest situations the factual judgment demanded of the court is diﬃcult or impossible to make through the use of judicial
procedures.”).
Com. Pictures Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 113 N.E.2d 502, 511 (N.Y. 1953) (Desmond, J., concurring), rev’d sub nom. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 532 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
Other Justices expressed similar views. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 427
(1966) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 701 (Clark, J., concurring). As Justice
Harlan summarized in 1966, “no stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised.” Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 455 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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beyond the scope of the First Amendment.371 Rather than identifying obscenity
in terms of its morally corrupting character, the test would be “whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest”—that is, sexual desire.372 So defined, the Court announced in Roth v. United States, “obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”373 In sum,
the majority’s way to avoid moral decision-making was to redefine obscenity and
then treat whether a particular work was obscene as a fact-bound inquiry.374 At
least to some degree, then, Roth moved obscenity cases onto their own doctrinal
track.
The obscenity cases, however, had exposed problems with allowing the government to prescribe moral boundaries on speech in an increasingly pluralist society. In theory, legislatures could still impose values-based limits on expression.375 But obscenity cases also powerfully illustrated the tensions between a
“balancing” approach and engrained expectations about the judicial role. Deciding whether particular speech acts were constitutionally privileged, Justice Harlan candidly observed, called for “constitutional judgment of the most sensitive

371.

372.
373.
374.

375.

Until the mid-1950s, it was taken for granted that the government had power to restrict speech
in order to promote public morality. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 3, Doubleday & Co. v. New
York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (No. 11) (acknowledging the power to suppress “obscene writings,
so long as that term is narrowly defined and applied”). Legal challenges thus focused on how
administrative censorship or judicial injunctions could be used to suppress obscenity.
Through the 1930s, the Court upheld such restrictions. See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931);
Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 298 (1913); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc.
Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 413-16 (1921). Decisions in the 1940s and
early 1950s then substantially curtailed the ability to suppress obscenity in advance. See, e.g.,
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1948) (holding that publishers of obscene material
may bring an overbreadth challenge); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157-59 (1946)
(overturning Burleson, 255 U.S. 407); Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502 (overturning Mut.
Film Corp., 236 U.S. 230). Finally, in the 1950s, the Court began to consider curtailing state
power to punish obscenity after the fact as well. See supra notes 338-355 and accompanying
text.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
Id. at 485.
Justice Harlan criticized this strategy. See id. at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not understand how the Court can resolve the constitutional problems
now before it without making its own independent judgment upon the character of the material . . . .”); see also Kalven, supra note 230, at 20 (agreeing with Justice Harlan’s critique).
Justice Harlan argued that the federal government lacked power to abridge speech on moral
grounds because “Congress has no substantive power over sexual morality,” Roth, 354 U.S. at
504 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but he also thought that state legislatures could conclude “that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a State
may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society,” id. at 501-02.
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and delicate kind.”376 And “in the last analysis,” he admitted, these assessments
were often “bound to be but individual subjective impressions.”377 Perhaps so.
But “individual subjective impressions” were the antithesis of neutral principles.
For Justice Black and Justice Douglas, the lesson was diﬀerent. Suppressing
whatever “the judge or the jury thinks has an undesirable impact on thoughts,”
they insisted, would “drastically . . . curtail the First Amendment.”378 Moreover,
legislative eﬀorts to address “problems of the wayward mind” might turn the
government into “the secular arm” of a “religious school of thought.”379 Consequently, they began to reject all morals-based restrictions of speech. “The legality
of a publication in this country,” Douglas concluded, “should never be allowed
to turn either on the purity of thought which it instills in the mind of the reader
or on the degree to which it oﬀends the community conscience.”380
While Terminiello had reflected an increasingly absolutist approach within a
paradigm of toleration, the opinions of Justice Black and Justice Douglas in obscenity cases suggested a diﬀerent framing: the government simply had no business trying to change the way that people think. Whether such eﬀorts were socially beneficial was beside the point. Instead, the First Amendment denied
governmental power to restrict speech in order to mold minds. Black and Douglas, in other words, were beginning to articulate a neutrality paradigm along the
lines that Richard Price had proposed nearly two centuries before.381
This shift away from toleration was likely reinforced by the types of cases the
Justices confronted throughout the 1950s. As Harry Kalven Jr. observed in 1960,
“the problems of the day have moved law from the classic issue of direct government prohibition of speech by criminal sanction to the perplexities of the oblique
sanctions found in loyalty oaths, administrative loyalty programs, and congressional investigations.”382 But rather than joining their colleagues in evaluating

376.

377.

378.
379.

380.
381.
382.
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Id. at 498.
Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 707 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (“[I]n the end, judgment cannot be escaped—the
judgment of this Court.”).
Roth, 354 U.S. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 80 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Roth, 354 U.S. at 512 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to “civic groups and church groups”).
For mid-twentieth-century links between censorship and Catholic activism, see Samantha
Barbas, The Esquire Case: A Lost Free Speech Landmark, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 28990 (2018).
Roth, 354 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
Harry Kalven, Jr., Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
315-16 (1960).
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whether legal restraints were punitive,383 Justice Black and Justice Douglas began to argue that the government simply had no jurisdiction over matters of belief, including the expression of those beliefs.384
Justice Black and Justice Douglas were not merely defending neutrality in
the procedural sense articulated by Wechsler. Rather, they were embracing a substantive notion of neutrality. The First Amendment’s “underlying premise,”
Douglas observed in 1959, was “that a complete hands-oﬀ policy on the part of
government is at times the only course.”385 And although the case at hand had
nothing to do with religion, he then cited a case interpreting the Establishment
Clause,386 which required neutrality with respect to religion.387 Douglas was
thus beginning to embrace a notion of neutrality in speech doctrine that was
interwoven with a broader shift toward a more values-neutral form of liberalism.388
Around the same time, Justice Black and Justice Douglas also began to employ content-neutrality analysis. Laws regulating acts that only “indirectly aﬀect
speech,” Black admitted in 1959, “can be upheld if the eﬀect on speech is minor
in relation to the need for control of the conduct.”389 Thus, “laws governing conduct . . . must be tested, though only by a balancing process, if they indirectly

383.

384.

385.
386.
387.
388.

389.

See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding that withholding otherwise available privileges from speakers was “in eﬀect to penalize them,” because the “deterrent eﬀect is
the same as if the State were to fine them”). For a survey of Justice Black’s willingness to find
eﬀective punishment through noncriminal means, see Reich, supra note 322, at 703-10.
See, e.g., Speiser, 357 U.S. at 535-36 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Adler v. Bd. of
Educ. of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 497 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[G]overnment should leave
the mind and spirit of man absolutely free.”).
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)).
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“[The First] Amendment requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.”).
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
437 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 435-36. See generally Stephen
A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Morals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1351
(1991) (“The central organizing idea in the contemporary characterization of liberalism, by
both liberals and their critics, has been the neutrality of the state toward moral ideals, or, to
use the more current phrase, conceptions of the good life.”). A deeper intellectual history
would be required to assess causal factors, or even to situate these developments more fully in
their social, intellectual, and geopolitical histories. My aim here is more genealogical, showing
that a subtle but important shift was occurring in the opinions of Justice Black and Justice
Douglas.
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).

935

the yale law journal

131:861

2022

aﬀect ideas.”390 But, he continued, “a law directly aimed at curtailing speech and
political persuasion” was always unconstitutional.391 By the late 1950s, then,
Black and Douglas were beginning to embrace both content and viewpoint neutrality.
Doctrine had come a long way. What began in the 1940s largely as a functionalist reinterpretation of common-law rules had shifted in the 1950s into a
balancing test.392 In this respect, doctrine in the 1950s generally reflected the
public-good requirement derived from the natural-rights tradition, rather than
the more rule-like common-law limits on governmental power. Speech rights
thus were generally defeasible in face of genuine public needs. And as a consequence, the earlier boundaries on privileged speech became less important.
But as the Court moved this analysis to the First Amendment—and away
from a broader rubric of natural rights—the Justices narrowed the scope of judicial review. Meaningful judicial scrutiny was only required, the Court explained,
when the government had regulated speech based on its content. The 1950s thus
served as a bridge to modern doctrine, even though it featured less robust constitutional protections for expression.
C. The Emergence of Modern Doctrine
In the early 1960s, the Justices switched course once again, moving to the
modern tiers-of-scrutiny framework.393 As we will see, the Court eventually
adopted a variant of Justice Black’s newfound view that content neutrality was a
constitutional requirement—not a threshold condition for applying deferential
balancing. And by the end of the decade, the Justices categorically rejected viewpoint-based rationales for restricting expression. Promoting morality “may be a

390.

Id. at 142; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1965) (describing the acceptance of the balancing test for evaluating content-neutral restrictions).
391. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,
70 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the use of balancing for evaluating “governmental
action that is aimed at speech and depends for its application upon the content of speech”).
392. See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 410 (1950); see also Siegel, supra note
294, at 217 (“[T]he Court turned what had been a speech-protective [‘clear and present danger’] test into a formula for ad hoc balancing ripe for deferential application.”).
393. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 356-57 (2006). As Siegel notes, the adoption of strict scrutiny was not ex
nihilo, but it did not fully emerge until the 1960s. Id. at 357.
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noble purpose,” they noted in 1969, “but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment.”394 Neutrality had emerged as the central principle in speech and press doctrine.
The doctrinal shift began once Justice Frankfurter left the bench in 1962.395
In a range of cases—many of which involved suppression of civil-rights activities—the Justices became far more protective of speech rights. In part, this included an eﬀort to revive older common-law privileges. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, for example, the Court recognized extra protection for speech on matters of public concern.396 But the Court substantially reformulated the privilege
in light of functional arguments.397 The privilege had previously required that
the defendant had to have acted with public-regarding motives.398 But the Court
in Sullivan defined “actual malice” as knowingly or recklessly making false statements.399 This test, Robert Post explains, “was designed . . . specifically to prevent defamation law from being used to implement local cultural mores.”400 It
also provided breathing space for speakers who might otherwise have had to face
the whims of biased juries.401
As a general matter, however, the Justices continued to use a balancing test
to address most speech-related problems. They did not adopt absolutism. But
394.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
See Siegel, supra note 393, at 375-80. As Siegel points out, developments in the late 1950s reflected a slightly broader view of expressive freedom. Id. at 363. But the shift was far more
dramatic after Frankfurter’s departure. Id. at 375.
396. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
397. See Post, supra note 118, at 552 (noting “New York Times’s functionalist perspective” and concluding that “what ultimately distinguished New York Times from preceding cases was the
influence of American instrumentalism”).
398. See, e.g., Phila., Wilmington & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 214 (1858) (defining
malice as “conceived in the spirit of mischief, or of criminal indiﬀerence to civil obligations”);
id. at 220 (Daniel, J., concurring) (defining malice as “a wicked or malevolent motive”). For
further evidence, see supra notes 116-118.
399. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. This standard did not allow finding “actual malice” from mere criminal intent. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
400. Post, supra note 118, at 554; cf. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 734 (1986) (describing the Court’s decision
in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), as “a repudiation of the maintenance of community
cohesion and identity as a legitimate justification for the regulation of speech”). As Post explains, the New York Times standard does not make intent irrelevant, but it avoids using “the
criterion of intent to enforce a civility rule.” Post, supra note 94, at 649. By contrast, intent
requirements that aim to enforce civility are, according to current doctrine, “inconsistent with
the neutrality necessary for public discourse.” Id. at 648.
401. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
395.
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now the government bore a much heavier burden under “strict scrutiny.”402 In
justifying this approach, the Court emphasized a variety of functional concerns,
including the need for “breathing space” so that speech was not stifled—or
“chilled”—by fears of liability.403
Initially, the triggering condition for strict scrutiny was unclear. In the freeexercise context, the Court held that incidental burdens suﬃced.404 And in Cox
v. Louisiana, the Justices also did not focus on whether the law singled out particular messages, relying instead on a distinction between “pure speech” and expressive conduct.405 Writing separately in Cox, however, Justice Black focused on
neutrality.406 “Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is
willing to have discussed on its streets,” he wrote. “This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”407 Only in cases involving neutral statutes, Black insisted, was it
appropriate for judges to “weigh the circumstances.”408
Eventually, the Justices settled on a middle course. Strict scrutiny applied to
restrictions based on the content of speech. Content-neutral restrictions, by contrast, triggered a less rigorous balancing test known as “intermediate scrutiny.”
When the law did not single out certain messages, Chief Justice Warren explained in United States v. O’Brien,409 the government still needed to demonstrate
that any restriction of expressive freedom “furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest . . . unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”410
402.

See Siegel, supra note 393, at 377-78.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
404. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
405. 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (“We deal in this
case not with free speech alone, but with expression mixed with particular conduct.”); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12, 22
(discussing the majority’s distinction between pure speech and “speech plus”).
406. Cox, 379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., concurring).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 578.
409. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
410. Id. at 377. With content neutrality no longer used as a screening mechanism to determine the
“coverage” of the First Amendment, the range of cases potentially subject to heightened judicial scrutiny broadened. As we have seen, the Court had already expanded the idea of “matters
of public concern” in cases such as Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), and it had generally
abandoned any reliance on “matters of public concern” as a threshold limit on who could bring
speech claims in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). In theory, at least, the notion that
the First Amendment only protected speech on “matters of public concern” survived Winters,
but that label lost relevance in the 1950s as the Court used balancing. For practical purposes,
then, regulations of things like “commercial speech” were constitutionally unproblematic in
403.
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At least in theory, strict scrutiny did not exclude particular types of governmental interests. The test required only that they be “compelling.”411 But the
Court quickly suggested that one interest was illegitimate. “The Fourteenth
Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of
unpopular views,” the Court observed in Edwards v. South Carolina.412 In a certain sense, that principle would have elicited no dissent from Justice Frankfurter
or Justice Jackson. But by quoting at length from Justice Douglas’s decision in
Terminiello, Justice Stewart signaled an unwillingness to credit interests that
were tied to communicative harms.413
The Court then embraced that suggestion more fully in Stanley v. Georgia.414
Robert Eli Stanley had been prosecuted for possessing obscene films in his home.
The Court reversed the conviction. The interest in restricting obscenity, Justice
Marshall wrote for the Court, was confined to “commercial distribution of obscene material,” not including “mere private possession of such material.”415 The
latter, he insisted, implicated the fundamental right of privacy:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the
First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or

411.
412.

413.
414.
415.

that period. But the increase in judicial scrutiny of content-based regulations in the 1960s
then made those types of regulations far more problematic. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). To be sure, O’Brien observed that
the First Amendment did not apply to “an apparently limitless variety of conduct [that] can
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express
an idea.” 391 U.S. at 376. But the Court was now extending First Amendment coverage to
conduct that was “suﬃciently imbued with elements of communication.” Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). Justice Black sought to draw a formalist distinction between
“speech” and “conduct.” See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also Blocher, supra note 24, at 384 n.23 (citing relevant sources). However, this
distinction was devastatingly critiqued. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines,
82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 78-80 (1968); Kalven, supra note 405, at 23.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965) (“[A] function
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may
strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling eﬀects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is . . . protected against censorship
or punishment.” (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949))).
Edwards, 372 U.S at 238.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 563-64.
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what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.416
Justice Marshall then addressed potential governmental interests. The first was
“to protect the individual’s mind from the eﬀects of obscenity.”417 But he had no
trouble rejecting this justification out of hand. “We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the right
to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts,” Marshall declared.418 “To
some, this may be a noble purpose,” he continued, “but it is wholly inconsistent
with the philosophy of the First Amendment.”419
Although Justice Marshall relied on the longstanding idea that individuals
have a right to espouse their views, he also was drawing a new lesson: the governmental interest could not rest on a moral judgment. “Whatever the power of
the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality,”
he stated, “it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of
controlling a person’s private thoughts.”420 And even if Georgia could show that
pornography led to deviant behavior, Marshall continued, the proper antidote
was to suppress the behavior itself, not the “private consumption of ideas and
information.”421 Georgia “may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct,” he wrote, “than it
may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to
the manufacture of homemade spirits.”422
The Court reinforced this approach just two weeks later in Street v. New York.
The defendant had violated a state law making it a crime “publicly [to] mutilate,
deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or
act [any flag of the United States].”423 Street had, in fact, burned an American
flag, but the Court—over vigorous dissents—limited its analysis to whether a

416.

Id. at 565.
Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 565-66. Stanley was a privacy case, but the opinion explicitly assessed the governmental
interests in First Amendment terms. In a footnote, Justice Marshall quoted Louis Henkin, id.
at 565 n.8 (quoting Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 391, 395 (1963)), in a piece that disputed state power to regulate morality, even though
that power was unquestioned “earlier in the history of the Constitution.” Henkin, supra, at
392.
420. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
421. Id. at 566.
422. Id. at 567.
417.

423.
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state could punish someone for verbally deriding the flag.424 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan explained that any “shock” experienced by others would
turn on “the content of the ideas expressed,” and it was “firmly settled that under
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves oﬀensive to some of their hearers.”425 Nor could
the state assert an interest in safeguarding “respect for our national symbol.”426
In support, Harlan quoted at length from Barnette.427
With the general embrace of content neutrality and rejection of viewpointbased interests, neutrality had emerged as the constitutional lodestar in First
Amendment cases. “[A]bove all else,” the Court declared in 1972 in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, “the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”428 Justice Marshall then tied that understanding to tradition.
“[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship,” he insisted. And “[t]he essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.”429 In sum, Marshall concluded, “[t]here is an ‘equality
of status in the field of ideas . . . .’”430
And how could it be otherwise? Justice Marshall’s reasoning seems unassailable: censorship is antithetical to free expression, and “content control” is the
essence of censorship; therefore, “government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”431 Q.E.D.
424.

The Court explained that it was not clear whether the finder of fact relied on verbal or nonverbal acts, and therefore the possibility of an unconstitutional verdict premised on the former
was suﬃcient to warrant reversal of the conviction. Id. at 589-90, 594. But see id. at 596, 595
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that there was “no doubt that appellant was convicted
solely for burning the American flag,” and criticizing the Court for “declin[ing] to meet and
resolve the basic question presented in the case”); id. at 609-10 (Black, J., dissenting) (same);
id. at 611 (White, J., dissenting) (same).
425. Id. at 592. Harlan reiterated this principle two years later in Cohen v. California, stating that
eﬀorts to maintain “a suitable level of discourse within the body politic” were contrary to the
“powerful medicine” of the First Amendment, which “is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
23-24 (1971). He also reasoned that a lack of “principled distinctions in this area” accounted
“largely” for why “the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
426. Street, 394 U.S. at 593.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

Id. The appellant’s brief emphasized the same passages. See Brief for Appellant at 25, Street,
394 U.S. 576 (No. 5).
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
Id. at 96.
Id. (quoting MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 341, at 27).
Id. at 95.
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Yet Mosley’s “anticensorial” approach reinforces just how far views of expressive freedom had come. Even the rhetoric was transformative. Prior to the 1960s,
“censorship” did not mean any and all content regulation. Rather, it referred specifically to administrative control over expression, especially with respect to prior
restraints.432
With the embrace of neutrality, however, the rule against prior restraints left
scholars puzzled. “[I]t is not altogether clear just what a prior restraint is or just
what is the matter with it,” Harry Kalven remarked in 1971.433 The doctrine, John
Jeﬀries observed a decade later, had become “fundamentally unintelligible.”434 It
is not hard to see why. The original premise of the rule—that legislators and
jurors had to police the boundaries of expressive freedom—was now antithetical
to the Court’s neutrality-based conception of the First Amendment.435
And the Court never looked back. In the 1970s, debates shifted to how neutrality principles should be defined and potentially extended.436 Liberal-leaning
Justices wanted to exclude moral justifications for restricting other forms of liberty, particularly in cases involving reproductive and sexual freedom.437 Meanwhile, conservative-leaning Justices used neutrality to squelch eﬀorts to equalize
speaking power.438 To be sure, some Justices defended content-based suppression in limited domains, like obscenity doctrine.439 But these were the exceptions
that proved the rule. Neutrality had become the central organizing principle of
First Amendment law.440
432.

See sources cited supra note 269.
Harry Kalven, Jr., Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 32 (1971).
434. John Calvin Jeﬀries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 419 (1983).
435. Along similar lines, the absence of neutrality in earlier conceptions of free speech can shed
light on other First Amendment paradoxes, like the absence of a neutrality principle when the
government “speaks,” see generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech,
52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011) (discussing governmental-speech doctrine), and the sometimesunprotected treatment of speech integral to criminal conduct, see generally Volokh, supra note
342, at 1326-46 (discussing this category of speech doctrine).
436. For a discussion of the shift toward a more formalist approach to neutrality, rather than one
more sensitive to speech-restrictive eﬀects, see Lakier, supra note 34.
437. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 110-11 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199, 210-12
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
438. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18, 48-49 (1976); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S.
652, 679-80 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). These cases involved what are sometimes called
speaker-based restrictions. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”).
439. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1973).
440. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
433.
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***
Content and viewpoint neutrality did not emerge at the end of a linear or
predetermined path. Rather, the doctrines that the Justices embraced in the
1960s reflected an amalgam of diﬀerent ideas drawn from earlier decisions.
Some dimensions of neutrality were evident from the beginning—including a
doctrinal emphasis on curtailing administrative discretion and preventing the
arbitrary suppression of certain messages. But it would be inaccurate to view the
accretive nature of doctrinal shifts as indicating that neutrality was somehow
“inherent” in the First Amendment all along.441 Earlier notions of neutrality were
confined, and they did not suggest that agnosticism with respect to values was
constitutionally required. Even decades into the twentieth-century rebirth of the
First Amendment, the dominant paradigm was still one of socially bounded toleration. Neutrality only emerged as the bedrock principle of the First Amendment after a long and episodic process of constitutional change.
iv. implications
What can this jurisprudential history teach us today? In a time when angst
about expressive freedom is growing,442 and when federal-rights jurisprudence
more broadly is coming under immense strain,443 it is worth stepping back to
consider where we have been. History, it seems to me, cannot oﬀer straightforward solutions, particularly given how deeply entrenched many speech doctrines
have become. But it can at least help open our field of vision—illuminating the
source of current jurisprudential problems and suggesting, if only tentatively,
diﬀerent ways of thinking about fundamental rights.
The history recounted in this Article poses a substantial diﬃculty for modern
originalism. Many originalists describe their project in terms of recovering the
original meaning of constitutional text. Viewing the Constitution this way, they
argue, is a way of disciplining judicial analysis so that it can be more neutral and
less dependent on contestable and fluctuating assessments of value.444 In this
respect, originalism, textualism, and formalism often merge, reflecting a particular conception of what constitutional law should be. At the same time, however,
441.

Contra Karst, supra note 151, at 26. Karst’s conclusion may better reflect what Harry Kalven
described prior to his death in 1974 as “a deeply held consensus” favoring neutrality. HARRY
KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 17 (1988).
442. See supra note 35.
443. See, e.g., JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-21 (2018); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?: THE UNNECESSARY CONFLICT 66 (2020).
444. The classic statements of this view are Bork, supra note 362, and Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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modern originalists are deeply committed to viewing constitutional rights as judicially enforceable trumps.445 The very premise of modern rights, after all, is
that some things cannot be left to the give-and-take of ordinary politics.446
These ideas work in tandem in speech doctrine. The neutrality principle is
broadly applicable—supplying a way of resolving nearly any speech-related
problem. And it forecloses the sorts of values-based assessments that might
plague other approaches. Indeed, when the Solicitor General recently asserted
that gratuitous depictions of animal cruelty were beyond the ambit of the First
Amendment, the Court chastised the government for its “startling and dangerous” argument.447 “The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote in United States v. Stevens.448 The Justices, he insisted, were helpless to revise the “judgment by the
American people” about the scope of the First Amendment.449 That original
judgment, of course, was assumed to be a requirement of neutrality.
The irony here is that the neutrality principle was a product of the mid-twentieth-century constitutional revolution that originalism was designed to counter.
If originalists want to begin to dismantle functionalist innovations in First
Amendment law, as Justice Thomas has recently suggested,450 they will quickly
find that little remains. The entire edifice of modern doctrine is built on a foundation that only emerged within the past century.451
Perhaps neutrality is just too ensconced and that is the end of the matter.
Many originalists, after all, defend stare decisis.452 But if neutrality is here to stay,
should it continue to operate as a metaprinciple—justifying a nearly constant
expansion of the First Amendment in ways that pull doctrine further and further

445.

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676-78 (2015).
447. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
448. Id.
449. Id.; see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960) (“[T]he Framers themselves did this balancing . . . .”).
450. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 677 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (denying certiorari).
451. Even the facial analysis that the Court applied in Stevens was grounded on Justice Murphy’s
innovative opinion in Thornhill, calling on judges to “weigh the circumstances” in speech
cases. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940) (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
452. See, e.g., William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36 (2019); Michael W.
McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1767 (2015); Stephen E.
Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 861-64 (2015).
446.
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from original meaning?453 Should historical evidence matter in speech cases only
when it is consistent with neutrality?454 In a time when originalism and First
Amendment expansionism both seem to be on the ascent, these issues deserve
serious attention by scholars and judges.
More fundamentally, this Article highlights a transformation in thinking
about rights jurisprudence. Until the mid-twentieth century, fundamental rights
were bimodal. First, courts employed an ostensibly deferential ends-means test
to ensure that any legislation restricting natural rights was within the police
powers—that is, that the legislature was aiming to promote the public good.
These “rights” were not antiregulatory at all, and they did not exclude particular
reasons for restricting rights, so long as those reasons were public regarding. Second, courts applied a set of more determinate limits on legislative power that
included fundamental common-law rules. In this latter sense, rights were
“trumps.”455 Natural rights and common-law rights were thus the twin pillars of
American rights jurisprudence.
The modern notion of constitutional rights, by contrast, reflects a transmogrified synthesis of these earlier ideas. In terms of scope, modern rights privilege
certain realms of freedom, like communicative activity,456 rather than specific,
historically defined limits on governmental power or general protection for liberty. Nor do modern rights carry the same implications for governmental authority. “Personal rights,” Suzanna Sherry explains, “are about preventing political majorities from imposing their values on individuals who may not share

453.

See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2015)
(“[T]he First Amendment’s territory [has] pushe[d] outward to encompass ever more areas
of law.”).
454. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 391 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he dissent
cites a law-review article arguing that ‘corruption’ was originally understood to include ‘moral
decay’ and even actions taken by citizens in pursuit of private rather than public ends. . . . [I]f
speech can be prohibited . . . [on that basis] then there is no limit to the Government’s censorship power.” (quoting Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341, 373, 378 (2009))).
455. For the term “rights as trumps,” see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205
(1977). For a related discussion of Dworkin’s views, see Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312-15 (2000); and Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301, 302-07 (2000).
456. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam). But see Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (arguing that First Amendment coverage does not, in fact,
extend to all communicative activities).
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those values.”457 The very idea of rights, then, limits the reasons why the government can restrict them.458 The neutrality principle is a perfect illustration. Although the government is allowed to restrict speech in pursuit of any “compelling
interest,” it cannot assert an interest grounded on changing the way that people
think.459 To do so would violate the core of what rights are: individual entitlements to make judgments about the moral limits of one’s own freedom.
History cannot tell us whether this view of rights is a good idea.460 But tracing the rise of neutrality can at least raise awareness that substantive-rights jurisprudence is deeply unoriginal. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,” Justice
Scalia declared in Heller, emphasizing that “[t]he First Amendment contains the
freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified.”461 Perhaps that is true in
some theoretical or aspirational sense.462 But in practice, not even close. And not
because of a few nonoriginalist turns along the way. The entire jurisprudential
project is new. What began as a functional reinterpretation of inherited rules has
morphed into something else entirely. And the core principle of social-contract
theory—the priority of the public good—is now mostly gone.
conclusion
American law has always been protective of diﬀerent views, but not through
content and viewpoint neutrality. For well over a century, only well-intentioned

457.

Sherry, supra note 23, at 570.
See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998); Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules:
The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1998); Richard
H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711-12 (1994).
459. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. This principle does much of the “heavy lifting in
free speech cases,” notwithstanding the common view that the level of scrutiny is determinative. Volokh, supra note 9, at 2447.
460. A vast literature expresses concern about rights discourse. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON
FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 9-14
(2011); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
14 (1991); Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34-38 (2018);
JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH RIGHTS IS TEARING
AMERICA APART 8 (2021).
461. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
462. As a jurisprudential claim about the “true” meaning of the Constitution, one might assert—
notwithstanding current case law—that the Constitution means today what it meant at the
Founding. See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253, 2254 (2014).
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speech on matters of public concern enjoyed any determinate protection against
ex post punishments, otherwise leaving the government with plenty of room to
suppress harmful speech. With the decline of classical legal thought and the embrace of a more functional view of constitutional law, however, older doctrinal
categories began to shift and merge. And at the end of a long and bumpy road,
the Justices eventually embraced a paradigm of neutrality.
Tracing these developments cannot alone tell us whether it is time to change
course. But history can at least help open our minds to the radical notions that
rights are not necessarily trumps and that a system of expressive freedom need
not be agnostic about the value of ideas.
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